The authorities in Belgrade may have found a superbly ironic loophole allowing them to hand Mr Slobodan Milosevic to the UN war crimes tribunal. But they have also triggered a storm of criticism and may have touched off the country's next big political crisis.
Ignoring a court ruling earlier, they based their decision on a constitutional clause designed by Mr Milosevic himself to keep a firm grip on power.
But, as a result, political infighting threatens to delay the economic and political reforms necessary for the country to use the foreign assistance pledged at the donors' conference which began in Brussels yesterday.
The Serbian government is the real power in Yugoslavia. Montenegro, Yugoslvia's second republic, has charted an increasingly independent course under its president, Mr Milo Djukanovic. Yugoslav institutions now have no authority in Montenegro and a pro-independence majority controls its parliament.
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, who took the lead in extraditing Mr Milosevic, has lost popularity among Serbs who believe their country is being bullied by the West. While the standing of Belgrade's economic technocrats may have risen internationally with Thursday's action, their position at home has weakened, at least in the short run.
In the longer term, the international community, by demanding that Mr Milosevic be sent to The Hague as a condition of financial aid and restructuring of debt, created a situation where Belgrade's economic programme was doomed unless it handed over the former president.
While recent public-opinion polls indicate that about half Serbia's citizens supported sending Mr Milosevic to The Hague, for many that was a grudging choice taken only because the alternative was economic disaster. Bowing to the inevitable has not won Mr Djindjic popularity, although some residents of Belgrade on Thursday expressed admiration for his courage. There have also been death threats against some leading reformers, including those during a Thursday evening rally by Milosevic supporters.
Meanwhile, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica, who is both an ally and a political rival of Mr Djindjic, has succeeded in having it both ways. He has grudgingly gone along with the decision to hand Mr Milosevic over but has scored points by criticising the way it was done.
"Tonight's extradition of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague . . . could not be considered legal or constitutional," Mr Kostunica said in a televised address.
"Out of the arsenal of Mr Milosevic's policies, which really were disastrous for the state and the people, its most undemocratic elements have been taken over and revived - lawlessness, and making hasty and humiliating moves that no one in the international community has asked for, at least not explicitly," Mr Kostunica said.
Observers believe Mr Kostunica might pull out of the governing coalition, which could trigger early elections. And public-opinion polls indicate he is by far the most popular politician in Serbia.
Supporters of reform worry that a complete falling out between Mr Kostunica and Mr Djindjic could force economic technocrats, most of whom support Mr Djindjic, out of both the federal and Serbian governments.
Despite his personal popularity, Mr Kostunica lacks a strong party base or the loyalty of large numbers of highly capable officials.
Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court on Thursday issued an order blocking implementation of a decree passed on Saturday by the Yugoslav cabinet that was aimed at providing a legal basis for Mr Milosevic's handover. The freeze was meant to allow time for the court to consider whether to rule on the constitutionality of the decree, as requested by Mr Milosevic's lawyers.
But the Serbian cabinet responded by shipping Mr Milosevic off to The Hague anyway and justifying its action with a clause in the Serbian constitution that allows the republic to ignore federal authorities if their actions are deemed not to be in Serbia's interests.
When the constitution was written, Mr Milosevic was Serbian president and still worried whether he would get control of Yugoslav institutions, including its army.