The present leader of the Ulster Unionist Party Reg Empey warned the British government in 1976 that in Northern Ireland 'no middle course was possible and the majority would have to be backed, with safeguards for the minority'.
Mr (now Sir) Reg Empey was speaking as part of a United Ulster Unionist Coalition deputation which met the Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees at Stormont Castle on January 5, 1976 to discuss the Northern Ireland Convention's majority report, according to files just opened in Belfast. The report demanded a return to majority rule at Stormont.
Opening the discussion, the Ulster Unionist leader, Harry West said that the UUUC would be 'extremely unhappy' if their proposals were to be set aside. They had tried to bring minority parties into a dialogue about future arrangements but 'the SDLP had finally refused to resume talking'. The UUP leader claimed that the will of the great majority in Northern Ireland was clear. In no way could the SDLP's claims to seats in government be justified with a share of the vote of less than 25 per cent. 'The memories which the loyalist population had of the destructive tactics of the SDLP were still too vivid for the electorate to tolerate the inclusion of such men in government.'
For his part, the DUP leader, Dr Paisley said it would be unfair not to spell out to Mr Rees that if the Convention report were to be rejected by the government this would lead inevitably to a clash with the Ulster people. However, the Secretary of State pointed out that in earlier debates Dr Paisley had acknowledged that at the end of the day HMG and parliament must decide.
Mr Rees went on to say that he had been considering the general historical trend of events over the period 1920-72 and he asked the delegation for their views as to why the minority community as a whole had never supported the Stormont system. Mr Empey drew a distinction between unenthusiastic acceptance and downright rejection - there had been a large measure of acceptance by the Catholic community, otherwise the system could not have operated.
The Rev Martin Smyth said that the lack of full acceptance of the state by the minority had its roots in the all-Ireland mythology peddled by the Dublin government and sporadically thrust into the limelight by IRA gunmen.
The Secretary of State asked the delegation what made them think that the minority community would now accept a return to the Stormont set-up. The UUUC delegation rejected the assumption that their proposals amounted to a return to the pre-1972 situation; they had put forward radically new proposals for the involvement of the minority. They firmly believed that the SDLP and the Catholic community would accept these proposals once it was made clear that nothing further was on offer. However, Mr Rees said that the fundamental issue in a political settlement was how to overcome the deep division in the community.
Mr Empey said that the community position had deteriorated seriously in recent years, largely because the stability which had been established had been upset - most of all by HMG's [ British government] interventions. Doors which had seemed to be closed forever, for example, Irish unification - had suddenly been opened again. This had given the IRA new hope, as had HMG's rejection of total integration in 1972.
Conversely, these events had alarmed the Unionist population and made the Catholics unsure as to who would eventually win. He pointed to Mr Harold Wilson's 15-year plan (for Irish unity) as the spectre which haunted loyalist thinking on this issue. The loyalists had seen concessions to the SDLP and other republican elements on every hand - disbandment of the B Specials, destruction of Stormont, PR voting, etc - and it was not surprising that less responsible elements should have decided that only by violence could concessions be won from the British government.
The UUC said that what was needed above all was for HMG to say clearly to the SDLP that they had no chance of a place in government at this stage because the majority community was against it. Dr Paisley said the loyalist community would simply not tolerate any further concessions to Republicans; the wilder men on the Protestant side would take over and the drift would be towards civil war
Elaborating on the background reasons for loyalist fears (and, therefore, the mood of "no compromise") the Rev Smyth blamed the segregationalist policies of the Roman Catholic Church which trained its young in loyalty to another state.
The Secretary of State said that the policy of the government was clear: there would be no opting out of Northern Ireland while the province could not be forced into the Irish Republic. At the same time, being part of the UK was a matter for the UK majority. Responding, Mr Empey said that the traditional spirit of fair play had led Westminster to avoid coming down in favour of one side or the other; but it was a fact of life that they were dealing with two irreconcilables - no middle course was possible and the majority would have to be backed, with safeguards for the minority.