The rejection of the Treaty of Nice by the Irish electorate is not the end of the world as we know it, nor is it the end - or even a delay - of the enlargement process. It is true the reasons for the rejection are multiple and complex and need to be addressed. The people have spoken and must be listened to. In the meantime, life must go on.
A number of options are available. It is clear the enlargement process can continue without delay. The first five applicant countries could be accommodated (if they were ready) following the same procedure as has always applied for new member-states, including Ireland. In other words, the relevant accession treaty would deal with the additional membership of the institutions and bodies as well as the voting arrangements for the adoption of secondary legislation. Our rejection of the treaty does not alter this.
The requirement adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty for a rejigging of the membership of the institutions and bodies and the voting thresholds, once membership reached 20 member-states, could be addressed by a simple one-page, even one-paragraph, separate treaty.
Belgium takes over the presidency in July. This separate treaty could be drawn from the relevant institutional provisions of the Treaty of Nice and presented to the first Belgian European Council for signature. It could be processed by the member-states in accordance with their constitutional requirements, including being presented to the Irish electorate for agreement, before the end of 2001.
If this process were adopted, it would confirm the commitment to enlargement and allay any fears held by applicant countries that Ireland (or any other country) was opposed to new member-states.
Immediate reactions to the rejection do not seem particularly well thought out. To suggest that enlargement is stalled is to overlook the process which has operated to date. To suggest that the fact that five new member-states represent the trigger for rejigging the distribution of membership of the institutions and bodies and the voting means making a value judgment as to which five countries to admit and which seven to exclude, ignores the reality of accession.
Realistically, the first accession is not anticipated before 2004. There are existing evaluation processes vis-a-vis readiness for membership. The first five new member-states will come from those prepared for the new challenges when they are deemed ready. If a brief separate treaty to deal with the institutional changes were ratified by all member-states, then enlargement could continue as originally planned.
The more difficult task re mains the response to Ireland's rejection of the treaty. Not to listen to the electorate would be to compound some of the fears expressed during the campaign, that the EU is becoming less accountable and more undemocratic. Whether this is true is not really relevant; this is a perception and it would be prudent not to act as if to confirm it.
The boycott of Austria by the 14 member-states as a response to the election of members of the Freedom Party and their inclusion in government has been seen in some quarters as an example of a lack of parity of esteem towards small member-states, as well as an attack on the democratic process. After all, the Austrian people voted in free and democratic elections.
To suggest that Ireland will just have to conform and accept what has been agreed at Nice would be to ignore the democratic expression of the electorate - not to mention existing treaty provisions.
The Treaty on European Union, which is the gateway treaty for EU accession, provides for all amendments to the existing treaties to be done by unanimity and for ratification of new treaties to be in accordance with national constitutional requirements. The Irish people have said No to Nice as it stands, therefore it must be revisited.
The suggestion that the route followed after the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish electorate should be taken is not acceptable. This took the form of four declarations attached to the Maastricht Treaty addressing Danish concerns. From a legal point of view, this was questionable. Declarations do not have legal status. The Danes voted a second time on the basis of non-legally binding declarations. Even if this non-legal route were acceptable, what issues could be addressed?
The suggestion that there be a separate protocol to address Irish concerns is also unacceptable on a number of counts.
Although protocols are legally binding, this would continue the unfortunate trend which emerged with the Maastricht Treaty, that of individual opt-ins and opt-outs. The original Common Market provided for a common level playing field. Cherry-picking is not an option. Even if this route were acceptable, what issues could be addressed?
Ireland is the only member-state holding a referendum on the Nice Treaty. The framers of the treaty and their political masters must listen to and seek to address the concerns expressed. They would do the European project a disservice and confirm fears if they were to suggest that this is a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation - not to mention contradicting the existing treaty safeguards concerning unanimity and national constitutional requirements.
There are steps which could be taken: in the short term, admit up to five new member-states following existing accession procedures; (short to) medium term, adopt a brief treaty dealing with institutional arrangements post20 plus member-states, and (medium to) long term, revisit the Treaty of Nice and the concerns of the electorates in the member-states. This would confirm the EU as an accountable and democratic organisation.
Respect for democracy and the rule of law are conditions of EU membership, which should be seen to apply equally to existing as well as new member-states.
Patricia Conlan is a lecturer in European law at the University of Limerick