Iraq:The US arrest of an Iraqi minister may herald a wider assault on the militia loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, writes Michael Jansen.
The seizure yesterday by US and local forces of a senior Sadrist figure in Iraq's government is seen by members of the movement headed by radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr as an attempt to provoke its militia into attacking US troops, providing a pretext for US and Iraqi forces to wage a full-scale war against the Sadrists.
The detainee, deputy health minister Hakim al-Zamili, is the second high-ranking Sadrist official to be arrested recently. Last month, Mr Sadr's spokesman in Baghdad, Sheikh Abdel Hadi al-Darraji, was arrested at a mosque in Sadr City.
The arrests have, so far, failed to elicit a violent Sadrist response. Mr Sadr has repeatedly declared that his movement will co-operate with the government in its drive to restore stability to the capital. He ordered his militiamen not to confront US or Iraqi troops during the continuing security operation. They were instructed to go south, or to melt into the populace.
Nevertheless, Washington seems intent on confronting the Sadrists. In 2004 they fought US forces on the streets of Najaf and Sadr City and during the past year they have kidnapped, murdered and ethnically cleansed tens of thousands of Sunnis.
However, they cannot be easily uprooted or sidelined. They constitute a major political party, with 32 seats in parliament, the largest faction in the dominant Shia coalition. Sadrists hold the portfolios of health, agriculture, transport, civil society, public works and tourism. Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki belongs to the Dawa movement founded by Mr Sadr's uncle and father.
The Sadrists projected Mr Maliki into the top job and he has relied on them to stay in power. Consequently, he has been unwilling to take on the militia, which has as many as 60,000 members, or fire its ministers for mismanagement, corruption and fostering sectarian violence.
Mr Maliki counts on the Sadrists, an independent Arab Shia movement with a mass following, to counter the faction known as the "Persians", led by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim. His influence depends on the SCIRI militia, the 10-20,000-strong Badr Corps, which was raised, trained, and armed - and continues to be funded - by Tehran.
Instead of tackling SCIRI and its militia, the US seems to have accepted that the "Persians", who support the US presence in the country as well as enjoying close ties with Tehran, will play a key role in governing Iraq.
The charges against Mr Zamili - stuffing his ministry with members of his party, smuggling weapons, funnelling funds to militiamen and participating in sectarian warfare - could also be levelled against SCIRI ministers, particularly those in charge of the interior ministry, who have recruited their militiamen into the police and deployed them as death squads against Sunnis and former Baathists.
It is ironic that the US is so determined to eliminate the Sadrists, because Iraqi unity could depend on their alliance with Mr Maliki. Both oppose Mr Hakim's call for a nine-province autonomous Shia region in the south, comparable to the autonomous Kurdish region in the north.
If implemented, Mr Hakim's scheme could lead to the partition of Iraq into warring Kurdish, Sunni and Shia statelets.
