Stormont officials did not rule out the possibility of 'violent resistance' following the ending of Special Category status for paramilitary prisoners in March 1976, according to confidential documents just released in Belfast.
Special status had been introduced in June 1972 by the then Secretary of State, William Whitelaw following a hunger strike in Belfast Prison. However, the Gardiner Committee in 1975 had come out strongly against it, leading Merlyn Rees, as Secretary of State, to announce its phasing out from March 1, 1976.
A memo on the issue was circulated to the members of the Policy Coordinating Committee at Stormont on March 10, 1976. This explained that 'special status' sought to distinguish between 'ordinary criminals' and those serving sentences due to the 'disturbed political situation'. The document went on: 'The demand for some form of special recognition of politically motivated offenders has been a recurring theme of troubled times in Irish history. The classification of special category introduced in 1972 is a purely administrative arrangement; it is not in any sense a legal classification. It is available only for convicted prisoners serving sentences of nine months or more.
'Prisoners apply to the governor for special category. [He] seeks advice from the security forces as to whether the prisoner was associated with the paramilitary group of which he claims membership. On the basis of this advice a decision is taken. Refusal of applications is comparatively rare …' There were three elements in special category status. 'First, they are not required to do work; second, they can wear their own clothing; thirdly, they are allowed weekly letters at public expense and weekly visits and parcels which may include food and tobacco.'
The memo revealed that the population of special category prisoners had grown rapidly both in numbers and as a proportion of the total population of convicted prisoners. In 1973, there were 379 special category prisoners, representing about forty two per cent of the convicted prison population. By the time of writing (March 1976), there were 1498 special category prisoners, amounting to sixty eight per cent of the population. By this stage the proportion of Loyalist prisoners in this category had steadily increased. No less than fifteen per cent of the special category group had been sentenced for murder or violence against the person.
In a normal prison situation, the memo went on, the basic sanction was to confine the recalcitrant prisoner to his cell. In Northern Ireland, however, 'the unprecedented growth in prison population meant that this sanction was not available.' With up to eighty prisoners occupying a compound, it had not been possible to apply a normal prison regime.
The memo acknowledged the existence of paramilitary control structures in the North's jails. 'Inevitably, the compounds have thrown up their own leaders who may in some cases exert considerable power and influence over the man. Special category is in effect a declaration of continued allegiance to paramilitary groups which organise or condone violent crimes. Community attitudes to crime and to prison are blurred when offenders can be represented as loyalist or republican prisoners of war. Special category is regarded as a badge of respectability, particularly amongst young prisoners.'
The result was that prisoners' families felt that they could 'hold up their heads in the local community' if their son enjoyed special category status. Moreover, such status encourages prisoners, their organisations and families to hold firmly to the mistaken belief that one day they will be the subject of an amnesty.'
The document acknowledged that the special category problem had to be dealt with but added: 'We have no illusions about its deep-rooted nature or the difficulties which will have to be overcome.' The crucial first requirement was for cells as 'to seek to abolish special category when the prisoners concerned remain in compounds is out of the question.' The task of ending special category could only be made to work by starting with new offenders.
In conclusion, the memo estimated that the expected intake of paramilitary prisoners would be about sixty each month. 'We cannot put the existing 1500 special category prisoners into cells, but by a firm decision not to grant special category status to any prisoner convicted of an offence committed after 1 March 1976, we can be reasonably certain of having cellular accommodation, work and training available.' In the long run, therefore, the number of special category prisoners would gradually decline as new admissions ceased and existing prisoners were released.
In a final paragraph, the document admitted that there would be 'difficult times ahead': 'And above all, we may expect resistance, possibly violent resistance, to the ending of new admissions to special category. But there is widespread agreement that this problem simply must be tackled.'
Within two weeks of the government's decision, the Provisional IRA issued a threat to prison warders operating the new scheme and on September 16, 1976 Kieran Nugent, the first IRA member convicted since the abolition of special category status, refused to wear prison clothes. The 'blanket protest' had begun.