There may have been a feeling of deja vu among the Irish negotiators at the Lynch-Wilson summit of February 14th, 1968. The tone and content of the exchanges bear a striking similarity to the first meeting between the two men shortly after Jack Lynch became Taoiseach in the winter of 1966.
Again it was the European Community and the advantage of dovetailing each state's application for membership which was the central preoccupation: and it was still General de Gaulle's antipathy to British membership which had left both governments in limbo.
As to interim measures short of membership the British were against: Foreign Secretary George Brown said: "No compromise was possible between joining and not joining the Community"; and Prime Minister Harold Wilson summed up the free trade area idea as "a blind alley which would get us nowhere slowly."
Mr Lynch indicated that he was inclined to share these views. He asked if it was the British view that for as long as de Gaulle remained, Britain would be excluded.
Mr Brown replied that "never" was "a very strong word" but he allowed that "we should plan on the assumption that membership is out as long as General de Gaulle is in office."
Both Mr Brown and Mr Wilson inquired as to what the Irish position would be if the French offered an interim arrangement to the Republic.
Mr Wilson suggested that de Gaulle "might seek to divide friends," but thought that this would not serve French economic interests.
In a further memorandum - which was given a restricted circulation - the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hugh McCann, confirmed Mr Brown's preoccupation with the possibility that de Gaulle might mischievously offer Ireland a bilateral deal to split Dublin and London.
Mr Brown had "clear evidence" that de Gaulle was seeking to interest the Swedes in a bilateral deal. Mr McCann reassured him that in the case of Ireland, "the French had not sought mischief in this way."
Another sidelight from Mr Brown was what Mr McCann called his "exaggerated attack" on RTE television programmes. Again, unfortunately, there are no details, but Mr Brown was famous for getting into trouble in interviews and then blaming the interviewer.
In Mr McCann's formal note of the summit, he records some praise from the British side for Irish achievements in the foreign policy field: the Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson, spoke of the "splendid contribution" which the Irish peace-keeping troops were making in Cyprus; and Mr Brown suggested that since Ireland "enjoyed special respect" at the United Nations Frank Aiken, on his next visit there, "should endeavour to talk some sense into U Thant on this Vietnam issue."
He also thought Mr Con Cremin - Ireland's Ambassador at the UN - could "help towards this end" and commended "the splendid work" done by Mr Cremin in connection with the Middle East - "work for which they in Britain got the credit."
An indication of the relatively benign period which the mid1960s represented on the Partition question can be gleaned from the relatively low priority it received at this summit. Mr McCann comments on the "brief reference" to North-South relations when Mr Wilson asked Mr Lynch how he was getting along with Capt O'Neill.
Mr Lynch reassured him that matters were "proceeding smoothly enough" and Mr Wilson expressed sympathy for Capt O'Neill "in his difficulties", adding that when he had last met Capt O'Neill with Mr Brian Faulkner, "he had made a point of making his attitude as clear to Mr Faulkner as he had earlier to Capt O'Neill so that Mr Faulkner would not seek to isolate Capt O'Neill."
In the margins of this summit Dr Ken Whitaker, Finance Secretary and assiduous caretaker of North-South co-operation, was being his usual indefatigable self.
In a meeting with Sir Arthur Snelling, Deputy Under-Secretary in the Commonwealth Office, Dr Whitaker "took advantage of the occasion to inquire unofficially from him what the British authorities saw, or would like to see, as the ultimate outcome."
Sir Arthur admitted that "having been plagued with the Irish Question" for so long, the British now wanted nothing more than "not to be disturbed" by the issue.
This did not amount to "a frigidly neutral attitude". Rather were they benevolent "towards any solution that might be agreed upon in Ireland between Irishmen" - while not doing "anything to push Northern Ireland into a unified Ireland."
Dr Whitaker suggested that "if a match" were to be arranged in Ireland, the British Exchequer "could reasonably be expected to provide the N.I. daughter with an adequate marriage settlement" - an arrangement which Dr Whitaker advocated in the context of the existing "substantial subsidies" from London to the North.
He then mooted that regional government could be preserved in the North but with "the transfer to Dublin, with some changes perhaps, of the jurisdiction now reserved to Westminster."
Sir Arthur expressed some interest in these ideas and, although doubtful regarding their appeal to British politicians, he assured Dr Whitaker that "he would note for consideration the suggestion that a `marriage settlement' operating for a considerable period of time would be a desirable `send-off' for Northern Ireland."