A multinational combat force sent to the Lebanon with an unrealistic mandate could find itself in open armed confrontation with Hizbullah , writes Tom Clonan
As the wrangle over the precise formula of words necessary for a UN Security Council resolution capable of bringing about a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hizbullah draws to a close this weekend, one recurring theme is emerging. Most of the major players in the dispute are unanimous in their acceptance that some form of robust armed force is required to "fill the security vacuum" that exists between the Litani river and the border with Israel in south Lebanon.
Even Hizbullah has hinted that it might accept the presence of a multinational peacekeeping force in south Lebanon. Just this week, in a significant development, two Hizbullah deputies within Fouad Siniora's Lebanese cabinet agreed, in principle, to the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops to south Lebanon - to be reinforced by multinational peacekeeping forces operating under a UN mandate.
This agreement, however, was only secured in the context of the Lebanese prime minister's proposed "seven point plan" for a cessation of hostilities with Israel. This plan includes such terms as the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese soil, a mutual exchange of prisoners and the ending of Israel's occupation of the contested Shebaa farms area of southeast Lebanon.
Israel for its part has stated repeatedly that it will not withdraw from south Lebanon until a multinational combat force - specifically geared for peace-enforcement - has deployed to the area. Israel's insistence on a robustly mandated peace-enforcement mission to Lebanon - capable of engaging and disarming Hizbullah - may prove unacceptable to Hizbullah. The revised UN resolution envisages a withdrawal by Hizbullah from south Lebanon to a line north of the river Litani, with a multinational peace-enforcement mission - reinforced by 15,000 Lebanese troops - deployed south from the Litani to the Israeli border. Such a multinational force, consisting most likely of French, German, Italian and Australian troops, if deployed on a UN Chapter 7 peace-enforcement basis - a euphemism for a full combat deployment - would run the risk of being seen by Hizbullah as a proxy army for Israel and the US designed to continue a hostile armed occupation within Lebanon.
In such circumstances, Hizbullah would continue to resist any attempt to disarm it or inhibit its activities within Lebanon by force of arms - irrespective of the identity or bona fides of such a UN force or its backing by the Lebanese government. In other words, if a multinational force with an over-ambitious or unrealistic mandate is foisted on Hizbullah, it might find itself very quickly in open armed confrontation with Hizbullah. In effect, such a force, despite the best of intentions, might simply replace Israel as a perceived army of occupation within south Lebanon.
The LAF would be more or less powerless to reinforce or give legitimacy to any such UN peace-enforcement mission in any meaningful way. It is poorly equipped and armed and functions primarily as a rag-tag gendarmerie providing armed support to the Lebanese police. The LAF does not operate as a conventional army and for the most part occupies static checkpoints and barracks throughout the north of the country.
These positions normally consist of run-down corrugated iron shacks painted in the red, white and green of the Lebanese flag and surrounded by clapped-out US and Soviet tanks dating from the 1940s and 1950s. Many of these tanks are inoperable and are half-buried into permanent positions overlooking road junctions, bridges and vital installations - many of which have been destroyed in recent weeks by Israeli bombs. In short, the Lebanese army does not enjoy any recognition or status as a sovereign army in south Lebanon - it is merely tolerated by Hizbullah.
Attention will no doubt therefore be focused in the coming days on impending UN Security Council resolutions that will likely propose a robust multinational mission to south Lebanon to end the current fighting. The success or otherwise of such a force will depend on whether or not it is accepted in Lebanon by Hizbullah.
Ireland's experience in south Lebanon taught the Irish military two vital lessons about operations in the Levant. Having lost 47 Irish soldiers on peacekeeping duties in Lebanon, an analysis of the circumstances of those killed in action reveals that approximately 50 per cent of Irish casualties were inflicted by Islamic resistance groups such as Hizbullah - the remaining 50 per cent by the Israelis and their militias in the area.
This 50-50 divide of losses to either side in the conflict came as a direct result of having been deployed in the midst of two particularly bitter and indiscriminate adversaries - an unfortunate feature of UN peacekeeping missions to Lebanon. Any force deploying to south Lebanon in the coming weeks and months can therefore expect to take casualties from both sides in any renewed exchange of hostilities.
The second lesson learned by Irish troops serving in Lebanon centred on our perceived neutral status and the type of mandate under which Irish troops operated. With no post-colonial associations in the Middle East and our status as a neutral country - non-members of Nato - Irish troops initially enjoyed something of a honeymoon period on their deployment. However, despite the "softly-softly" mandate of Unifil's peacekeeping mission, on those occasions when the Irish did seek to fulfil the UN mission by limited coercion or force of arms - retribution was swift and brutal. During various confrontations over the years in Lebanon, Irish troops were - on more than one occasion - abducted and executed by both parties to the conflict. Any multinational force - particularly on a peace-enforcement or combat footing - that deploys to Lebanon can therefore expect to meet with fierce, even savage opposition, particularly if perceived by Hizbullah as a hostile force allied to either US or Israeli interests.
Israel will use the coming days and weeks - the "diplomatic window" afforded by efforts to arrive at meaningful UN security resolutions and the assembly and deployment of a multinational force - to inflict as much damage as possible on Hizbullah.
Whilst Israel may inflict more damage on Lebanon's infrastructure in this way, the Lebanese civilian population will suffer - support for Hizbullah will not.
In the long-term, the success of any international military intervention in Lebanon will depend on whether or not Hizbullah allows it to succeed. If Israel cannot disarm Hizbullah by force in the coming weeks - neither will any international force that is deployed to Lebanon in the months following. The key to the successful resolution of Lebanon and Israel's current crisis may well reside in further compromises and tortuous negotiations. Compromise, not escalation will provide a long-term solution.
- Dr Tom Clonan is The Irish Times security analyst