Few of those who have appeared before the Public Accounts Committee DIRT inquiry have come out with their reputations enhanced. All of the banks had a problem with bogus non-resident accounts, although it was worse in some than in others. The Department of Finance and the Central Bank have pleaded, not entirely convincingly, that it was not their job to tackle the problem. And we still have to hear from the ministers for finance who held office since the introduction of DIRT in 1986.
However, some of the most serious questions have been posed to the Revenue Commissioners. Why was it not more active in chasing up bogus non-resident accounts? Why did it not seek DIRT payments from the pre-1991 period from AIB? And why did it not act on suggestions from some of its own officials for new measures which could help to tackle the problem?
It has not provided satisfactory answers. Senior Revenue figures have pleaded that they did not operate in a vacuum. They have pointed out the concerns in the Department of Finance and the Central Bank that clamping down on bogus accounts could lead to a flight of capital from the State. Also, they have said - with some justification - that the policies of successive governments and the limited powers given to the Revenue indicated a complete lack of political will to tackle this issue. A string of government decisions suggested, the Revenue pleads, that elected politicians did not want the taxman poking around bank accounts and were happy to turn a blind eye to the tax evasion involved.
This attitude culminated in the decision in 1993 to grant a tax amnesty to evaders; in fairness to the Revenue the decision of Mr Albert Reynolds's government to introduce this amnesty was a disgraceful one, which did much to undermine the authority of the Revenue and the integrity of the entire tax collection system.
That said, the Revenue's job is to collect taxes without fear or favour, under the legislation set down by the Oireachtas. In the area of DIRT it simply did not do its job. Despite clear evidence of a widespread problem throughout the financial system in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Revenue never even tried to root out the problem. It matters little, in one sense, whether or not it had a tacit agreement with AIB not to collect DIRT tax liabilities for the years before 1991; the fact of the matter is that it never tried to collect these taxes. The evidence given by some senior Revenue figures has also not served the institution well. Confusion over who wrote certain key memos - including one instructing tax inspectors not to examine non-resident declarations - has damaged the Revenue's case. So has the inaction of its commissioners in reaction to suggestions from officials on how to tackle the bogus accounts issue.
Over the past couple of years, under its chairman, Dermot Quigley, the Revenue has become a more efficient and professional institution. However, further change may be needed. The hearings of the committee have thrown into sharp focus the curious structure in the Revenue, which has a chairman (who is effectively chief executive) and a couple of senior colleague commissioners, but no other check provided by a board or a non-executive chairman.
Given the need for absolute confidentiality and independence in the workings of the Revenue, a plc-style structure with a chairman, chief executive and largely non-executive board of directors might not be appropriate. But when drawing up its recommendations, the Public Accounts Committee should consider what type of arrangements might balance the special requirements of the Revenue against the need for proper control, appropriate corporate governance and accountability.