The Northern Ireland policing issue was always going to be very difficult to resolve. In Middle Eastern terms one might almost describe it as the "Jerusalem" of the Northern Ireland problem.
In the course of the negotiation of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, we made several proposals for changes in policing in Northern Ireland, including the possible employment of members of the Garda Siochana in some areas, as well as regionalisation of the force and/or a separation of anti-terrorist activity from normal policing.
Nothing came of these proposals, however, and even when the introduction and public promulgation of a police code of conduct in the immediate aftermath of that agreement was promised, that action was deferred for two years, before being released to the police without any publicity whatever. This measure thus lost any potential value it might have had as a measure of reassurance to the minority community.
Historians will no doubt in due course debate the relative merits of the Irish and British government views on the interaction of security and politics in the Northern Ireland situation during the quarter of a century between 1970 and the mid-1990s. Throughout that period, the British approach was always dominated by security considerations. Securing intelligence on the IRA and defeating its campaign militarily was given an absolute priority, regardless of the effect that the often harsh, and sometimes even brutal, implementation of these policies had within the minority community - among whose members it visibly increased tolerance of and often also generated support for the IRA.
Irish governments - rightly sceptical, as it turned out, about the capacity of the security forces to defeat the IRA militarily by such measures - have persistently pressed for a different strategy: one that would involve a much lower security profile and far less harassment of young people in nationalist areas. It was the Irish belief that such a shift would significantly reduce support for the IRA and thus induce an eventual abandonment of the Armalite in favour of the ballot-box.
The 1984-85 negotiations secured a modest shift in British security policy. Electoral support for Sinn Fein dropped by one-third in the aftermath of the agreement. This reflected the fact that the inadequate implementation by the British government of some security aspects of the agreement was offset by the positive impact on nationalist opinion of the absurdly overblown unionist response to the agreement. This made it necessary for Sinn Fein to review its strategy, which in time led to the peace process.
Out of the peace process emerged the Patten commission, which reflected a very belated British response to the long-established need to create a policing system that would be acceptable to the nationalist as well as the unionist community.
The choice of Chris Patten as chairman was a brilliant initiative. What ensured its success, however, was the way in which the members insisted on hearing the views of people from both communities in every part of Northern Ireland. For many of those attending these meetings, it was a novel experience to have to sit and listen to the other side's story.
The extraordinary patience shown by the members of the commission throughout this lengthy process greatly increased the chances of most of its eventual recommendations being received in a reasonably rational way - especially as this intensive exposure to the views, and prejudices, of both sides helped them to formulate their recommendations in sensitive terms.
In particular, this approach eventually made it easier for Sinn Fein to give what might be described as a guarded welcome to a report that inevitably fell well short of some of its less realistic demands. However sensitively the commission addressed the symbolic issues of the name and badge of the reformed force, it was inevitable that these would remain issues of division and controversy. And, whatever decision the British government was eventually to reach on these issues was bound to be controversial.
In that connection, I recall that not long ago in a radio discussion Albert Reynolds and myself got ourselves into hot water with nationalist spokesmen by suggesting what we thought might be a workable compromise solution to one of these problems. So we shouldn't blame the British government too much for having had difficulty with these matters.
What was unexpected and unfortunate, however, was the extraordinarily indecisive and confused manner in which the British government chose to handle these difficult symbolic issues - culminating in the breaking of an agreement with the Irish Government on a late amendment to the name clause. It is impossible to justify this clumsiness, which has inevitably helped to de-stabilise the whole nationalist community.
But what has been little short of disastrous has been the unnecessary complications introduced by the decision of the Secretary of State to allow some of his civil servants and security advisers in Northern Ireland to water down many of the Patten recommendations that had been designed to ensure the independence of the reformed police force and the maintenance of high standards of policing.
There was nothing surprising about the fact that this watering down was proposed to the Secretary of State by interested parties. But he should have had the good sense to reject most or possibly all of these proposals. For he had more than enough on his plate already with the symbolic issues. The conservative instincts of security forces in relation to matters that affect them is notorious. I can recall that when in 1986 the British government utilised its reciprocal rights under the Anglo-Irish Agreement to propose to us certain modifications in Garda procedure and organisation, these did not commend themselves to the force.
Given that I was concerned to ensure that the British take seriously the many proposals that we were making to them, including particularly ones relating to security matters, I devoted a whole weekend to working with one of my advisers on the British suggestions. One of these would in my view have weakened the effectiveness of Garda operations, and I rejected it out of hand. But on close examination, all the others were sensible ideas, which I instructed the minister for justice to have implemented - and this was done without further demur, to the advantage of all concerned.
The fact that quite a number of the watering down proposals which the Secretary of State had allowed to be incorporated in the Bill were subsequently withdrawn during the Commons debate is clear proof of the foolishness of their initial inclusion in the Bill.
Unfortunately, there still remains a whole series of further security-force-inspired dilutions of the Patten Report which need also to be withdrawn or substantially modified if the whole purpose of the policy reform is not to be undermined. In relation to these matters I have found entirely convincing Prof Brendan O'Leary's analysis on this page earlier this week of what amendments still need to be made, and I regret the unconvincing comments on it made on this page by the British ambassador.
When I read Gerry Adams's article on this page last Wednesday, I have to say that I found myself in substantial agreement with him - an unfamiliar experience for me. It must surely be clear that Sinn Fein's capacity to deliver any kind of support for, or acceptance of, a new policing system depends on the faithful implementation of the Patten report - undiluted by the kind of watering down into which the Secretary of State has been misled by some of his security-oriented advisers.
Tony Blair must surely realise that he and his ministerial colleague already have enough on their plates in seeking to reconcile the continuing sensitivities of the two communities on the symbolic issues, without allowing backsliding on Patten to prejudice the future effective policing of Northern Ireland.