When 320 German soldiers crossed the border into Poland last January, they were greeted with open arms. Their destination: Zamosc, 60km from Poland’s border with Ukraine. Their mission: to install and operate Patriot missile systems donated by Berlin. When Germany’s defence minister Boris Pistorius visited the facility earlier this month, Polish colleague Mariusz Blaszczak laid on a military brass band and asked the Germans to stay.
After six months, though, Germany moved three of its Patriot systems stationed in eastern Europe to Lithuania, soon to be followed by boots on the ground. Some 4,000 German soldiers, a full brigade, are to be stationed permanently in Lithuania, along with families and equipment.
None of this was a given, bearing in mind the brutal legacy of Nazi armed forces, the Wehrmacht, in Poland and its Baltic neighbours. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has scrambled history and forced eastern Nato partners into far closer alliances with Berlin than many could have imagined even two years ago.
In Germany, too, tortured postwar debates about the role of its military, and the impossibility of foreign deployments, have given way – in record time – to a brave new world.
Nearly 18 months after chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “Zeitenwende” – watershed – in foreign and security policy, Germany’s new role in European security began to firm up at the Nato summit in Vilnius.
As part of the Zeitenwende, Germany’s €100 billion special fund, to repair and revive the military, has been matched by a €60 billion annual budget. In this month’s federal budget, defence was the only portfolio not to face cuts.
Then there are Germany’s donations to Ukraine since the war began. After early rows over delayed deliveries, Germany has to date supplied Ukraine with equipment worth nearly €4 billion – from tanks and munition to air defence systems and anti-mine equipment. In Vilnius, Scholz announced further deliveries worth €700 million, including 40 troop transport vehicles and 25 battle tanks.
Looking ahead, Germany is working on plans to turn its entire navy and air resources to Nato for the first time since the end of the cold war, while talks are concluding on a new German tank repair factory on Polish territory near Ukraine for the fastest-possible turnaround.
“Nato is a defence alliance but it’s ready and capable to counter any kind of military threat,” said Scholz after the two-day summit, insisting Germany would play a leading role in the alliance’s new European security plan.
In Vilnius, he committed to having 35,000 German troops in operational readiness by 2025, making Germany Europe’s largest source of troops.
The country’s defence minister confirmed that Nato’s new 4,400-page defence plan, agreed in Vilnius, gives Germany a “key role”. Alongside Poland, geography and geopolitics have turned Germany and its infrastructure into a key Nato hub for transporting troops and equipment as Nato ramps up defence on its eastern wall.
“Everything going from west to east has to go through Germany,” said Pistorius. “If a worst-case arrives, or is expected, then things have to go quickly, the deployments have to work quickly and reliably.”
As risks grow in Europe, meanwhile, German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock presented a long-awaited new strategy on Friday to “derisk” – rather than “decouple” – Berlin from Beijing.
The new 64-page strategy says Germany’s €85 billion trade surplus with Beijing will oblige it to reduce exposure if China moves away further from the “norms” of the rules-based international order.
“For Germany, China remains a partner, competitor and systemic rival, but the aspect of systemic rivalry has in recent years increasingly come to the fore,” said Baerbock.
[ Irish combat medics return from training Ukrainian troops in GermanyOpens in new window ]
Acknowledging that Germany’s dependencies on China have “taken on greater significance in recent years”, she announced confidential talks with German companies operating in China and warned them in advance: “Companies that make themselves dependent to a large extent on the Chinese market will in the future have to carry the financial risk more heavily themselves.”
Presenting the new China strategy in Berlin, Baerbock said tighter budgets and new Nato obligations meant Germany “simply can’t afford to do a second time what we had to do as a result of the Russian war of aggression: spend over €200 billion ... to free ourselves from a dependency.”
