How both sides used terror in the War of Independence

British actions contributed to their own defeat, which was a part of the Irish strategy

Auxiliaries  talk to a postman with a GPO mail cart in Dublin. Photograph:  Walshe/Getty Images
Auxiliaries talk to a postman with a GPO mail cart in Dublin. Photograph: Walshe/Getty Images

During 1919-1921 the British and the Irish actions often reflected one another in fighting the War of Independence. It must be emphasised that both sides used terror – murder, burnings, shearing women’s hair – to intimidate the Irish population, and both the British and the Irish were aware of the effects of terror and trauma. The book invites the reader to approach the topic of terrorism from a new perspective – according to which terrorism is just one of the forms of political violence that was used in the War of Independence.

The principal goals of terrorism are to intimidate and demoralise – terrorism essentially aims at influencing an audience, and in the Irish War there were several audiences to be influenced: the Irish police forces (RIC and DMP), the Irish people, the British people, international opinion, and politicians on both sides. We should always ask: what explains the excess of terror and counter-terror in the war? This is not always popular – but to understand conflict one must confront what people do when they set out to kill one another.

The War of Independence was notorious for violence, with a great deal of that violence being attributed to the Black and Tans, and the Auxiliary Division of the Royal Irish Constabulary. The common response by the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries to multiple deadly attacks was to burn houses, farmhouses and creameries in the immediate area of an IRA ambush. British Field Marshal Henry Wilson said of the Black and Tans: “reprisals were being carried out without anyone being responsible; men were being murdered, houses burnt, villages wrecked … It was the business of the Government to govern. If these men ought to be murdered, then the Government ought to murder them.” Clearly Wilson was not averse to reprisals per se, just that that they were being carried out by undisciplined individuals.

It is important to note that action by and toward state agents can be terrorism just as actions by and toward non-state agents can be terrorism. Police officers could be the targets of terrorism by assassination just as the police could be the perpetrators of terrorism. The terror campaign escalated to the necessary level of intimidation and fear and that subsequently exhibited itself when the DMP took a “hands off” policy toward the Volunteers. Similar efforts against the RIC throughout the country resulted in many resignations from that force. All can experience intimidation, and causing others to change their lives is one of the foremost characteristics of terror.

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Terror became a part of the lives of those who lived throughout the country. There is a rippling effect to terrorism, the consequences of which impinge on lives and communities. As the war moved from 1919 into 1920 and beyond, both sides increasingly used violence leading to terror. Michael Collins and the Irish understood that the Irish could not get to their own governance by military means alone. The strategic function of the Irish warfare was to defeat the British psychologically and politically. Every IRA “outrage” was used to provoke British reaction and was a blow to the British will to persist. Those British reprisals would serve two purposes: first, they would mobilise Irish opinion, and second, any British brutality in Ireland, freely reported in the British and international press, would be judged morally intolerable by Britain’s liberal-minded political leaders. The British would contribute to their defeat by their own actions, and that was a part of the Irish strategy. Collins was playing politics with violence.

It is important that one does not overestimate nor underestimate the violence of the War of Independence. It was a savage and vicious war on both sides, and both eschewed the norms of war recognised at the time, leading to a breakdown in law. The response of the Irish, British and international press to terrorism cannot be overemphasised in explaining Lloyd George’s agreement to negotiate with the Irish. In modern terms referencing guerrilla war and terrorism, the Irish succeeded in winning “the battle of the narrative”.

All wars must teach lessons. If they do not, then they were fought in vain and those who fought them, and especially those who died, did so for nothing.

An essential lesson of the war is that physical injury and mental anguish bring with them uniquely different problems. Individually, each can cripple. A physical injury suffered as a result of the war immobilised many, whereas psychological trauma incapacitated by inflicting fear or taking away the individual's desire to continue their life. Separately, they were destructive, but taken together they were devastating.

After the war ended, the effects of the trauma it inflicted lingered across societies for years.

The terror war ended, but the trauma did not.

The Terror War is published by Eastwood Books, €20