The decommissioning of paramilitary weapons is still seen by Bertie Ahern as an intrinsic and necessary part of the Belfast Agreement. But the Taoiseach accepts it is not a specific requirement in advance of the establishment of a shadow executive in Northern Ireland.

Explaining his change of political direction to the Dail last week, Mr Ahern, said the two governments had "moved away from the agreement" at Hillsborough in their efforts to resolve the impasse. He thought the proposals which had involved putting arms beyond use and the establishment of an executive in transition were a fair compromise that allowed everyone to play their part in decommissioning, but unfortunately, it had not worked.

And for the first time, the Taoiseach was explicit about Sinn Fein's undertaking in those negotiations. "If an executive in transition was set up, there was a firm commitment (by Sinn Fein) that the arms issue would be dealt with by Easter 2000, within the period set by the agreement," he said.

Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had "done their best" in selling this package during the Easter period, Mr Ahern conceded, but they had not convinced their constituents to make the progress they thought was possible.

Following rejection by republicans of that formula, the two governments had devised a modified procedure at Downing Street. On this occasion, however, there was no public reference to "an obligation" on the IRA to put arms beyond use, and the emphasis switched to the establishment of a shadow executive.

A key element of the Hillsborough negotiations dealing with the involvement of Gen de Chastelain and decommissioning was, however, included at Downing Street. All parties there agreed "to the full implementation of all aspects of the agreement, including the objective of total disarmament and the complete withdrawal of all weapons from politics in Ireland." They accepted the arms issue "must be finally and satisfactorily settled and will do what they can to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within the time-frame set down in the agreement. . ."

To that end, Gen de Chastelain would engage in intensive discussions with all the parties and report on progress before June 30th. In the light of that work, all parties anticipated the devolution of powers to an executive by June 30th.

Clearly, some movement on decommissioning was anticipated by all the parties between the establishment of a shadow executive and the formal devolution of powers. But with a European election imminent and Drumcree on the horizon, David Trimble was unable to sell the altered formula to the Ulster Unionist Party.

Mr Ahern commented: "Mr Trimble did his best last week and Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness did their best at Easter."

A lack of trust on all sides has bedevilled the process. Mindful of the Sinn Fein leadership's failure to sell the Hillsborough formula, the Ulster Unionist Party sought further reassurance on the Downing Street document last week by asking the IRA if it recognised an obligation to decommission by next May. Such a statement by republicans could, the party said, act as a confidence-building measure and unlock the door to political progress.

The response from the IRA was a deafening silence.

As for itself, the UUP said it could not deliver an executive without a credible and verifiable start to a process of decommissioning.

In the face of such inflexibility, the two governments are now committed to deadlines which are in danger of unravelling. During their meetings at Chequers, Mr Ahern and Mr Tony Blair agreed they would - on the basis of further negotiations between the UUP and Sinn Fein - seek to trigger the d'Hondt process for establishing a shadow executive this week. And the deadline of May 30th, when powers were scheduled to be devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, was still active.

Few observers believe there will be significant movement in advance of the Northern elections on June 10th. And Mr Ahern signalled UUP difficulties with the June 30th deadline - because Drumcree comes four days later - to the Dail.

It was "pointless", the Taoiseach said, to try and force people to take decisions against their will. They all had to be brought along together in an inclusive process, because they would have to work together to create cross-community support within the Assembly.

At the same time, he emphasised the Government's anxiety to reach an accommodation by June 30th, in order to avoid a three-month political hiatus during which the Dail would be in recess. Further strenuous negotiations were required.

John Bruton's concerns over "artificial deadlines" and the possibility the two governments might not have an adequate contingency plan if the June 30th deadline was not achieved, failed to elicit information.

In response, the Taoiseach said the two governments would review the situation after June 30th. Neither he nor Mr Blair would predetermine what they would, or would not, do.

But it wasn't all grey. Extending the time limit for altering Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution by a further 12 months in the Dail, Mr Ahern catalogued the seismic shift that had taken place in Northern Ireland politics during the past year.

The North-South Council and the implementation bodies were ready to go; large numbers of prisoners had been released; security was being reduced and meetings between the UUP and Sinn Fein were routine. There was, however, a worrying increase in the number of sectarian attacks on Catholics.

Ruairi Quinn spoke of a resistance by UUP and Sinn Fein politicians to accept the new political reality of their mutual dependence within the Assembly. And he called for compromise.

After that, Mr Ahern received the support of Fine Gael and the Labour Party for extending the deadline concerning change in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. A bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland was still firmly in place.