Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions could provoke civil war or generate a broader military conflict involving Turkey or Iran, writes Tom Clonan
The acronym METTS is familiar to military commanders the world over. METTS analysis consists of a problem-solving approach to military scenarios under the following headings: mission, enemy, troops, terrain, space and time. When applied to the situation facing US commanders in Iraq, many challenges become apparent.
In terms of mission, the situation is complex. The military favours simple mission statements with clear objectives and a definite time-frame. The invasion phase of the war was a classic example of such a clearly defined mission - a rapid armoured advance on Baghdad, the removal of Saddam's regime and the destruction of his military infrastructure. These were clearly identifiable deliverables that were reasonably quantifiable in terms of operational planning and logistical support. The resulting campaign was an American Blitzkrieg that secured all three objectives.
The occupation and nation-building phases of the war have proven far more complex. The first objective in this mission - to provide a secure environment within which to facilitate reconstruction projects, consensus building and democratic structures - has not been achieved. Consequently, there can be no realistic time-frame for the achievement of a stable democracy.
Since the beginning of the conflict, there has been little consensus between the White House and the Pentagon as to precisely how long American troops should stay in Iraq. In this uncertain environment, the only clear direction given to US commanders under the new UN resolution is to the effect that the force "shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism". In other words, the US military, while technically no longer an occupying force, will remain on a war footing in Iraq.
The threats to the newly established Iraqi democracy are both internal and external. Internally, coalition forces have failed to destroy the many Shia, Kurdish and Sunni militias within the country. Centcom's original intention was to replace sectarian militias such as the Shia Badr brigades, Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni resistance groups with multi-ethnic, government-controlled security forces. The plan was to remove local paramilitary command structures and to disperse mono-ethnic Kurdish, Shia and Sunni forces whose internecine rivalries had the potential to plunge post-invasion Iraq into civil war. These objectives have not been achieved.
In the north of the country, approximately 60,000 Kurdish Peshmerga have simply donned Iraqi Civil Defence Corps and Iraqi Police uniforms. Their local commanders - with their original designs for Kurdish autonomy and independence - remain in place.
In the south, the Shia Badr Brigades and Dawa army, under pressure from Ayatollah al-Sistani, have been tolerated by coalition forces and are being integrated into the security environment of the new Iraq. Even Moqtada al-Sadr's infamous Mahdi army has been allowed to remain in existence.
Maj Gen Martin Dempsey of the US 1st Armoured Division - the unit tasked with the destruction of the Mahdi army - recently announced that up to 4,000 Mahdi army members might become the core element of the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps deployed to Najaf and Kerbala. In Falluja, many Shia leaders are dismayed at the creation by US forces of a predominantly Sunni security force consisting of many former members of Saddam's Republican Guard.
The failure to disband these militias and to create a non-sectarian security alternative for Iraq may pose serious problems for the interim government both internally and externally. In the short term, their continued existence may provide some limited security dividend. In the longer term, however, they may well divide Iraq along armed sectarian lines. This might lead to civil war. Such a civil war might also destabilise the region by involving Turkey and Iran in Iraq's internal affairs.
Turkey will not be keen to tolerate autonomy or independence for Iraq's Kurdish community for fear that it would reawaken Kurdish nationalism among the 10 million Kurds living in south-eastern Turkey.
The Turkish government waged a bitter internal war against Kurdish nationalism, which lasted from 1984 to 1999 and cost at least 37,000 lives. Just yesterday, suspected Kurdish rebels killed three Turkish soldiers in the latest flare-up of violence in the country's troubled southeast. In order to prevent a major resurgence of this internal crisis, Turkey might well be prepared to intervene militarily in northern Iraq to destroy any hope of an emergent Kurdish state within the region. With a modern, well-equipped army consisting of almost one million troops, Turkey would represent a considerable military threat to the sovereignty of the new Iraq. This is especially so given recent pointed reminders by Turkey's Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdrogan, that he strenuously opposes Kurdish autonomy.
With strong ideological and religious links between the Shia communities in Iran and Iraq, there is the possibility that Iran might also become involved in Iraq's internal affairs. Indeed, the leadership of the Shia Badr brigades were trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
The vast majority of Iraq's population is of Shia origin. As such, they stand to gain the most from the elections scheduled for 2005. If the Shia community in Iraq does not achieve its ambitions for majority rule under the current transition to democracy, its leaders might well seek military assistance from Iran.
While Iran's armed forces number approximately 600,000 troops, they are not considered an immediate threat to Iraqi territory due to equipment shortages and an old fashioned, Soviet-style order of battle. If called upon to assist their Shia neighbours, the Iranians would most likely do so covertly, supplying conventional arms and ammunition and possibly military advisers.
The Sunni community, comprising a mere 17 per cent of the Iraqi population has traditionally dominated and oppressed its fellow Shia and Kurdish Iraqis through force of arms. Elements of the Sunni community, including former supporters of Saddam and elements of al-Qaeda, will be keen to frustrate the interim government's timetable for elections. It is for these reasons that the recent spate of car bombs and suicide-bomber attacks on the forces and institutions of the fledgling Iraqi state have been concentrated in the Sunni triangle. The Sunni resistance movement, containing former members of Saddam's military elite and al-Qaeda members such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, poses a significant threat to the authority of the interim government.
Its attacks have been well planned and co-ordinated and show a sophistication that has thus far yielded spectacular successes, including the assassination of the former head of the Iraqi Governing Council, Ezzedine Salim earlier this year.
In terms of troops, terrain, space and time, the situation facing the Americans is ominous. They simply do not have enough troops in Iraq to counter the threats outlined and to effectively garrison over 20 million people in a country the size of France.
With no prospect of reinforcement from NATO and with no firm exit date in sight, Centcom's METTS analysis of their predicament in Iraq must make for depressing reading. For the Iraqis, there is the immediate prospect of civil war and regional instability. For the United States and the West in general, there is the more worrying prospect of a Muslim world that may now perceive western military power as ephemeral and transient.
Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer and fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society