THE German Chancellor, Dr Helmut Kohl, certainly upped the ante in Anglo German relations with this remark at the University of Lou vain. His speech warned about the dangers facing Europe if the "slowest ship", i.e., Britain, were permitted to dictate the pace of integration at the forthcoming Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) to review the Maastricht Treaty.
The speech was unexceptionable, in that its main themes have been delivered many times by Dr Kohl; on this occasion it did not attract much attention in Germany. In Britain, however, it infuriated Eurosceptics and Europhobes, but alerted others to the fundamental issues at stake in the current debate on Europe's future.
In that sense it was a very useful exercise. It provides an opportunity to assess what is arguably the most interesting polarity in contemporary European political discourse between German Christian Democracy's social market and quasi federal model of European politics and British Conservatism's institutionally diluted, socially deregulated and by way of rapid EU enlargement defederalised one.
"Nationalism that is war," Dr Kohl said, quoting Francois Mitterrand's speech last year to the European Parliament. He recalled for his audience that German troops had twice this century marched into Belgium, inflicting "severe damage" on the ancient city of Louvain.
He went on to question the role of the nation state. "We have no desire to return to the nation state of old. It cannot solve the great problems of the 2 1st century." He is afraid that a hegemonic Germany, free from the shackles of common European rules, would provoke nationalism among its neighbours and return Europe to the balance of power politics, the nationalism and the wars which "brought great suffering to our continent".
It follows that "we can only protect our common interests if we speak with one voice and pool our resources". This is also unexceptionable, considered on its own. But linked to another theme, variable geometry, it takes on a different colour: "If individual partners are not prepared to participate in certain steps towards integration, the others should not be denied the opportunity to develop increased co operation". However, nobody wants a European superstate, which"does not and never will exist".
Dr Kohl referred to the imperial nationalisms of the large powers, rather than to the more defensive nationalisms of those they invaded and occupied. But his warnings tend to bring out a defensive nationalism in Britain, particularly on the English right wing, which is reminded forcibly of previous German ultimatums and faits accomplis in Europe.
One Tory MP, Mr John Wilkinson, put it this way: "Wars have usually ensued from hegemonic ambitions on the continent. It has been Britain's duty to maintain a balance of power in Europe, and to do that we have got to keep our distance." It can be a dialogue of the deaf, in which a German leadership pleading for help to suppress the historical demons of its Europeans past by way of a more integrated Europe is seen to be just as menacing to British interests as a Germany going it alone.
Either way Britain is confronted by German hegemony, so the argument goes. It is better to keep the distance, emphasising global interests, continent wide concerns rather than a pooled sovereignty that would undermine that central institution, the nation state.
This response begs the large issue of whether the nation state is indeed capable of handling these questions, avoiding the twin forces of sub national fragmentation and supranational globalisation that afflict it. European integration has often responded to these dilemmas in the best British fashion, pragmatically, in such a way as to use the pooling of sovereignty to shore up rather than to undermine the nation state.
Dr Kohl's argument is that this will no longer be possible in an EU with up to 30 members and in a world economy and political system where Europe must compete with the US and Asia. He sets out four areas in which Germany wants to see progress at the IGC: a strengthened common foreign and security policy, with much more majority voting; an improvement in co operation against crime and drugs; greater openness and efficiency in decision making; and more powers for the European Parliament.
Underlying this rather dry list is the more fundamental geopolitical requirement of avoiding retrogression to the pattern of European politics earlier this century. Dr Kohl believes if the chance of progress for integration is lost, bit will take considerably longer than one generation before we are given such an opportunity again".
These are the words of an old man in a hurry, of course, as his British critics are quick to point out. He is now expected to stand again in the1998 federal elections. And he is determined to create the conditions that would enable a core group of states to make progress faster than the others who are unable or unwilling to join them.
This strategy of differentiated integration is being pressed by an influential group of German policy makers and political theorists. They take it for granted that monetary union and security and defence union are fundamental requirements for membership of the core group; and they are prepared to face into a political crisis over the next year and a half to clear the decks.
It is a function of political hegemony to set agendas in this way, which should not occasion too much surprise. But within Germany there is also a lively debate about whether Germany's best interests are served by more integration.
Ireland will once again be at the centre of these arguments about Germany's role, just as in the 1990 EU presidency following German unification, during the IGC and the EU presidency this year. It will also face hard choices about whether to aim for and align with, the core group, the British one, or some intermediate category.
