AN INVESTIGATION into an incident involving a Ryanair aircraft at a Dutch airport last year concluded that the co-pilot made a decision which only a captain is allowed make and that the decision was "improper and unsafe".
The Dutch Safety Board has published the findings of its investigation into the "serious incident" which occurred at Eindhoven Airport on June 4th, 2010.
Ryanair flight FR-7412 was taking off from Eindhoven en route to Faro in Portugal, when the first officer (co-pilot), who was flying the aircraft, rejected take-off at high speed believing the aircraft was "unsafe to fly".
The first officer rejected the take-off after the take-off decision speed (V1) and after the nose wheel had lifted off the ground.
The V1 speed is used during take-off to aid the pilot's decision-making process in the event of an engine failure or other significant problem.
Attempting to stop above V1 is considered hazardous due to the possibility of overrunning the end of the runway.
After initiating the rejected take-off, the Boeing 737-800 came to a stop about 500m from the end of the runway and sustained no damage while none of the 158 passengers or six crew was injured.
The first officer told the investigators he had difficulty keeping the aircraft on the centre line during take-off and when the aircraft reached the V1 speed the control column was moving without the application of force.
The first officer also stated that he experienced back pressure from the column and at this time he had the feeling the aircraft was unsafe to fly and aborted the take-off.
The auto brake system and speed brakes were automatically activated.
After the throttles were pulled back the captain took over the flight controls and completed the rejected take-off procedure.
After taxiing to the terminal, the flight crew expressed concern about overheated brakes and possible wheel fire. At the parking stand smoke was observed coming from the brakes and consequently, the crew decided to disembark the passengers and let the brakes cool off.
The investigation concluded that during the take-off at Eindhoven Airport the first officer perceived control column issues that were likely related to an outside atmospheric phenomenon.
The origin of this atmospheric phenomenon however could not be determined or explained with the information available.
The report concluded: "The take-off was rejected after the decision speed V1 and while the nose wheel was off the ground for approximately two seconds. The first officer considered the problems to be serious enough and decided to reject the take-off."
The six-chapter report states however: "According to company procedures only the captain is authorised to make a rejected take-off decision."
The investigating team also concluded: "To reject a take-off above V1, especially when the nose wheel is off the ground, is in principle considered to be improper and unsafe."
The safety board also stated that there was no specific guidance from the operator or manufacturer on dealing with control issues at the time of initiating a take-off.