There's a convention at meetings of the European Commission that reflects a principle of importance to the philosphy underpinning the EU's architecture. When a discussion touches on matters relating to a commissioner's home country, he/she is supposed to eschew the formulation "we in Ireland, Germany, Croatia . . . think", to refer instead to "the country I know best".
But the idea that commissioners have no national allegiances, only allegiance to the EU as a whole, is a theological nicety belied by the unseemly, very national, scramble for portfolios and senior jobs for each new commission every four years. Still a union of nation states, no matter what the sceptics may say. Capitals, no matter how willing to parrot the orthodoxy, are deeply wedded to getting their man or woman in the key place, as they see it, to bat for them. Trade, internal market, agriculture, competition . . . and experience would suggest that it pays, though, to be fair, only subtly.
The failure of EU leaders at the special summit this week to agree to a new high representative for foreign and security policy to succeed Catherine Ashton, reflects that same tussle for influence, compounded by the challenge of forging a consensus of 28 around whose national interest to privilege this time.
In theory the vote is majoritarian (a qualified, or expanded, majority is provided for), but in practice, because several top jobs are considered as a package to be shared out in a complex calculation balancing between parties, regions, genders, large and small states, euro and non-euro . . . a majority can only be achieved by reaching near unanimity. Then throw into the mix decisions on the "fair" share-outs of such other plums as the presidency of the European Parliament and the secretary generalship of Nato . . .
In recent years the EU has moved through several treaties to simplify decision-making by expanding majority voting. But, in simultaneously creating new senior EU-wide posts like those of high representative and president of the council, it has also effectively undone that process on the appointments front. Matters are further complicated by the requirements that two of the three jobs (the presidents of the council and commission) be at prime-ministerial level, and that the European Parliament must also approve two of them (commission president and high representative), while the MEPs also get to vote on the whole commission membership, and the commission president also has a veto on the high representative.
At a time of great vulnerability to criticism for its remoteness and supposed bureaucratic ineptness, the EU is sacrificing decision-making efficiency for forms of unwieldy intergovernmental accountability that may actually impede taking any decision at all. If it does so at the end of August it will be an achievement.