Hillsborough police chief was working to ‘flawed’ plan

David Duckenfield has agreed that his failure to close a tunnel was cause of 96 fans’ deaths

Former South Yorkshire Police chief superintendent David Duckenfield (left) leaves the coroner’s court in Warrington, north-west England, on Wednesday. Mr Duckenfield, the police chief at the 1989 Hillsborough stadium disaster, admitted on Tuesday that his failure to close a tunnel was the ‘direct cause’ of the deaths of 96 Liverpool supporters. Photograph: Paul Ellis/AFP/Getty Images
Former South Yorkshire Police chief superintendent David Duckenfield (left) leaves the coroner’s court in Warrington, north-west England, on Wednesday. Mr Duckenfield, the police chief at the 1989 Hillsborough stadium disaster, admitted on Tuesday that his failure to close a tunnel was the ‘direct cause’ of the deaths of 96 Liverpool supporters. Photograph: Paul Ellis/AFP/Getty Images

Hillsborough police chief David Duckenfield has told the jury into the inquests of 96 Liverpool fans that he was "a new and inexperienced match commander" faced with "unimaginably difficult and fast-moving circumstances".

He added he was working to "a flawed operational (match) order" and had "not envisaged or wished for death or injury to a single football supporter" in the central pens of the Leppings Lane terrace at the fateful FA Cup semi-final on April 15th, 1989 – Britain's worst sporting disaster.

On Tuesday day, Mr Duckenfield, (70), agreed that his failure to close the tunnel leading to those pens was the “direct cause” of the tragedy after he had just ordered the opening of an exit gate at the ground to relieve congestion at the Leppings Lane turnstiles.

The circumstances of that failure was outlined by his barrister on Wednesday as the retired chief superintendent from South Yorkshire Police gave evidence for a seventh day at the hearing in Warrington.

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Summing up his questioning of his client, John Beggs QC, said to Mr Duckenfield: “In front of this jury, Mr Duckenfield, many family members in court, and many many lawyers and journalists, you have admitted, haven’t you, some very serious professional failures?”

“Yes, sir,” he replied.

Mr Beggs said: “Do you agree that those serious failures were in circumstances where first you were new and inexperienced?”

The witness said: “Yes, sir.”

His barrister continued: “Were you working to what we now know was a flawed operational order?”

Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes, sir.”

Mr Beggs asked: “Were you at least from 2.30pm onwards, if not earlier, under intense pressure?”

Mr Duckenfield repeated: “Yes, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “Were you working in unimaginably difficult and fast-moving circumstances?”

Mr Duckenfield said again: “Yes, sir.”

Mr Beggs concluded: “When you went to Hillsborough on the morning of April 15th, 1989, was the very last outcome that you envisaged or wished for was death or injury to a single football supporter in those central pens?”

Mr Duckenfield said: “I did not want that at all, sir.”

Mr Duckenfield was promoted 19 days before the disaster and inherited the role of match commander at Sheffield Wednesday’s ground for the sell-out tie between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest – his first game in overall charge.

He told his barrister that on and leading up April 15th he did not ignore any advice given by experienced officers but he accepted as match commander that “the buck stops with me”.

Mr Beggs said it had been suggested by a number of barristers at the inquests that Mr Duckenfield alone should bear responsibility for the tragedy.

Mr Duckenfield agreed he had nothing to do with previous turnstile “failures” at Sheffield Wednesday and no one had advised him about them. He had no say on Liverpool being awarded the smaller end of the ground for the match with just 23 turnstiles.

In reality, he had “inherited” the police operation for the match. He also had nothing to do with signage at the ground or previous decisions to install perimeter fences and radial fences, its architectural features or any breaches of stadium safety guidance on crush barrier heights.

Mr Beggs asked: “If supporters turned up later in 1989 than in 1988, for whatever reason, was that something with which you had any control?” “No sir, ” said Mr Duckenfield.

Mr Beggs said: “The reality is this, Mr Duckenfield, your main focus on that day was crowd segregation?”

“Yes sir,” said Mr Duckenfield.

Mr Beggs continued: “And indeed the prevention of public disorder?”

Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes, sir.”

Mr Beggs: “Is the tragic reality, Mr Duckenfield, that you were not contemplating that any crisis would be one of crushing?”

Mr Duckenfield: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs: “Again the reality was that your focus in relation to safety was segregation?”

“It was sir,” replied the witness. He agreed he had not monitored crowds in pens at capacity games at Hillsborough before.

Mr Beggs asked: “Had you received any kind of training or instruction in monitoring of pens?” Mr Duckenfield said: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “Did you in fact know in April 1989 how to safely gauge crowd density?”

“No sir,” he replied.

Mr Duckenfield said that none of his four experienced colleagues in the police control box on the day gave him any hints on how to do so and none pointed out any problems with crown density.

He added that no officers at ground level sent any messages to suggest there were density problems, and that none of the Sheffield Wednesday directors and VIPs who “had been to the ground many times before” had pointed out to him that the terraces looked overcrowded.

No message of concern was passed from the club’s CCTV control room which also had access to numbers of fans coming through the turnstiles, he added.

Mr Beggs said: “Putting it in summation, Mr Duckenfield, prior to kick-off did any message come into the control box from any source at all to you that there was or may be problems with how those central pens were filling?”

Mr Duckenfield replied: “No, sir.” Mr Beggs said: “You in fact accept that you failed effectively to monitor those pens, don’t you?” The witness replied: “Yes, sir.” His barrister continued: “Is it the position that you really didn’t appreciate that they were in fact overcrowded?”

“That is correct, sir,” said Mr Duckenfield.

Mr Beggs said: “You know with the benefit of hindsight you were plainly wrong, you knew they were overcrowded by 3pm. You accept that?”

Mr Duckenfield said: “I do, sir.”

Mr Beggs asked: “Had you realised those central pens were overcrowded such as to threaten life or limb, would you have taken action?”

Mr Duckenfield replied: “I would, sir.”

His barrister said: “Is that because you would then have realised that people might have been crushed with horrific consequences?”

Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes, sir.”

He said that as early as 2.15pm he did not realise there were congestion problems at the Leppings Lane turnstiles and if he had anticipated large crowds arriving after 2.30pm, he would have directed additional officers to go there.

The jury has heard that at about 2.30pm he asked now-dead colleague Superintendent Bernard Murray whether fans would get into the match in time for kick-off and he was told they would.

Mr Beggs asked Mr Duckenfield: “Did you have any basis at the time for doubting Mr Murray’s judgment?” Mr Duckenfield replied: “No sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “You have already told us that he was far more experienced than you. He had been the ground commander the previous year.” Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes, sir.”

At around that time Mr Duckenfield did order a Tannoy announcement be made to the terraces, inviting supporters to move along and spread out, but after that did not consider delaying the kick-off.

Addressing the moment when Mr Duckenfield opened exit gate C at 2.52pm, which led to 2,000 fans entering and many going to the central pens, he said he felt he had “no choice” when a superintendent outside the turnstiles made his “stark plea” to open the gates.

Mr Beggs asked: “Did any other officer (in the control box) say ‘Look guv’nor, look boss, look David, we must not do that, we must not open the gates’.” Mr Duckenfield said: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs continued: “More importantly, did any of the four of them say ‘Open the gates but before you do so, you must close the central tunnel’?” Mr Duckenfield replied: “No one said anything.”

Mr Beggs said: “In one sentence, what were you trying to achieve?” Mr Duckenfield said: “To save lives, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “Is the tragic reality, as you have said many times before, that it simply did not cross your mind to where the supporters would go upon entering the concourse?” He replied: “Yes, sir.”

The barrister said: “Is it also right that if anyone else did think about that, they certainly did not raise it with you?” He replied: “Yes, sir.”

Mr Duckenfield was asked to describe his mood the following day after the disaster when he met chief constable Peter Wright. He told the jury: "In one word, sir, sombre ... deflated."

He went on to say he had never told any police officer how they should record the events of April 15th, 1989.

Mr Beggs asked: “Did you at any stage even encourage any other police officer or police civilians to change his or her statement?” He said: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs went on: “Did you change the content of the statement that the jury know was made by you on or before May 3rd, 1989?” He said: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “Did anyone ever ask you to change your statement?” He said: “No, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “It has been suggested by some of the barristers sitting in front of me there was some conspiracy to interfere with a fair collection of evidence. Did you have any part in that?” He said: “None at all, sir.”

Mr Beggs said: “Did you know anything about it?” Mr Duckenfield replied: “I did not.”

He confirmed he had no role in the subsequent investigation by West Midlands Police into the tragedy and had no part either in the direction of the force's case at Lord Justice Taylor's inquiry.

Giving evidence to the inquests on Tuesday Mr Duckenfield agreed that his failure to close a tunnel was the “direct cause” of the deaths of 96 Liverpool fans.

He accepted he “froze” during the 1989 football disaster before he ordered the opening of an exit gate to relieve congestion outside the Leppings Lane turnstile.

The now retired police chief was responding to questions from Paul Greaney QC, representing the Police Federation, during his sixth day of evidence at the new Hillsborough inquests in Warrington, Cheshire.

Mr Greaney reminded Mr Duckenfield of his earlier evidence to Christina Lambert QC, counsel for the inquest, about his state of mind after the opening of Gate C when he told her: “It was a momentous decision and your decision is such that you do not think of the next step. My mind for a moment went blank.”

Asked again if he had “froze”, Mr Duckenfield said: “It appears to be a distinct possibility.”

Mr Greaney said: “You know what was in your mind and I will ask just one last time. Will you accept that in fact you froze?”

“Yes sir,” said Mr Duckenfield.

Mr Greaney went on: “Do you agree with the following, that people died in a crush in the central pens?” Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes sir.”

Mr Greaney said: “That if they had not been permitted to flow down the tunnel into those central pens that would not have occurred?” The witness repeated: “Yes sir.”

The barrister continued: “That closing the tunnel would have prevented that and therefore would have prevented the tragedy.” Mr Duckenfield said again: “Yes sir.”

Mr Greaney said: “That you failed to recognise that there was a need to close that tunnel.” Mr Duckenfield said: “I did fail to recognise that sir.”

Mr Greaney said: “And therefore failed to take steps to achieve that.” Mr Duckenfield replied: “I did sir.”

Mr Greaney said: “That failure was the direct cause of the deaths of 96 persons in the Hillsborough tragedy.” Mr Duckenfield said: “Yes sir.”

PA