High-level talks between the US and Iran over the future of Iran’s nuclear programme ended on Thursday evening without agreement between the two sides but with an undertaking to reconvene in Vienna next week. Iranian sources, as well as Omani mediators, suggested significant progress had been made on key issues. However, there was no comment from the American side, which was the first hint that it may have had another agenda.*
On Saturday, US president Donald Trump said the US military and Israel had launched “major combat operations” in Iran, saying the country had attempted to rebuild its nuclear programme. Blasts were heard across multiple Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Isfahan, at the beginning of a military campaign that is expected to last several days.
“Our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime, a vicious group of very hard, terrible people,” Trump said on Truth Social.
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The negotiations between Iranian foreign minister Abbas Aragchi and US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner had taken place against the backdrop of a massive build-up of US military capacity in the Middle East over the course of recent weeks. This included the deployment by Trump of two aircraft carriers, one of which – the USS Gerald R Ford – is the largest of its kind in the world. Other warships, dozens of fighter jets and combat helicopters, as well as more than 5,000 service personnel, have also been sent to the region – along with the 40,000 troops already there.
Tracking data indicates more than half of newly deployed US aircraft landed in bases in Europe, almost certainly in order to keep them out of reach of Iranian missiles in the event of retaliation against the US attack. While some observers noted that the build-up constituted serious leverage for Trump in negotiations with Iran, the scale of the deployment always carried the risk of being a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ordering mobilisation on this level made it more difficult for Trump to back down.
Yet, the objectives of the military assault on Iran will remain unclear, and there is even less clarity regarding the consequences.
Trump has been issuing threats against Iran for some time, not least since the violent suppression of widespread protests against the regime earlier this year. Having told the protesters on social media that “help” was on its way, ultimately he took no action, dissuaded by a combination of pressure from Arab leaders and fear of Iranian retaliation.
Last week there was still hope that the current build-up was at least partly motivated by a concern to diminish the threat from any Iranian counterstrikes. That is now clearly not the case. But the ultimate goal of US policy remains opaque.
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Officials have talked variously about containing Iran’s nuclear programme, defusing its ballistic missile capability and constraining its sponsorship of regional proxies. US vice-president JD Vance asserted earlier this week that Washington had evidence Iran was trying to rebuild its nuclear programme. In his state of the union address, Trump referred to his determination to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The Iranians, for their part, deny any such ambitions. Araghchi recently claimed Iran remained “crystal clear” it would, under no circumstances, develop a nuclear weapon, while recognising the right of the Iranian people to the benefits of “peaceful nuclear technology”.
The American president came under pressure from the Israeli leadership to attack Iran to, at the very least, destroy its missile arsenal. Senior Israeli officials, including the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, made a secret visit to Washington at the end of January to push the US to launch an attack on the country. But other actors in the region are fearful of the consequences of a US strike. The leaders of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar favour a diplomatic solution, which would contain Iranian ambitions rather than destabilise the country.
The Gulf states might be happy to see Iran’s leadership weakened but fear a scenario of chaos and uncertainty and the possibility of more radical elements in the regime coming to power. Iran has repeatedly asserted that US bases in the region would be legitimate targets in the event of any American strike, which would place several of the Gulf states in the firing line.
The June 2025 attack by Iran on a US base in Qatar lingers in the memory of Gulf leadership, even if there were no casualties on that occasion. There is clear awareness conflict with Iran could see facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain come under attack. Conflict with Iran will almost certainly have highly negative economic consequences in both the short and longer terms, with the added potential for a refugee crisis. Iran might also respond to attack with a partial closure of the Straits of Hormuz, through which 20 per cent of the world’s oil passes. This would have obvious and significant impacts in the region and beyond.
There is also a strong possibility of retaliatory Iranian missile attacks against Israel. Israeli officials have speculated in recent days that Iran would find it easier to launch attacks on Israeli rather than US targets, with the added prospect that Iran’s allies in Lebanon and Yemen might join the fray.
However, while there is a great deal of anxiety across the region regarding the possibility of a chaotic end to the regime in Tehran, there is also little certainty this will be the outcome of the US attack.
Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic has been dramatically weakened by the events of recent years. Its nuclear programme has been effectively neutralised by US and Israeli assaults; its network of regional allies has been thoroughly degraded. The country’s economy has deteriorated enormously since the US withdrew during Trump’s first term in the White House from a previously negotiated deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, followed by the reimposition of US sanctions.
Indeed, the mass protests that broke out across the country at the end of last year were initially prompted by widespread economic distress.
Nonetheless, there are few signs the end of the Islamic Republic is imminent. The regime’s ferocious coercive apparatus appears to be intact. Internal opposition, although widespread, lacks the capacity to govern the country and exiled opposition to the regime is fragmented and weak. Nor would so-called “decapitation” in the form of attacks on the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and senior regime figures necessarily trigger the fall of the regime.
Following previous attacks, there are clear procedures to provide for succession in the case of key positions, while killing Khamenei, who holds a position of major religious as well as political significance, would most likely radicalise rather than moderate the regime.
There are few positive outcomes from the American assault on Iran.
*This article was updated at 9.30am on February 28th
