The effects upon society of contraception are more complex than many people allow, and the debate about the subject is often confused because different people are talking about different effects; sometimes without being clear, even to themselves, as to what aspect of the matter they are addressing.
Archbishop Desmond Connell's speech at Maynooth on Tuesday week has confused the issue still further. For while parts of his text address real issues arising from contraception, issues which some have preferred to ignore, the credibility of other parts has been undermined by one unfortunate passage.
This is his suggestion that "the wanted child is the child that is planned; the child produced by a decision of the parents begins to look more and more like a technological product . . . creating a sense of consumer ownership as well as a new anxiety to win and retain the affection of the child [who] no longer belongs to the family in a personal sense . . . This attitude of parents communicates itself to the child who experiences a resentment against a parentage based on power."
This is so remote from any conceivable reality of family life as actually experienced by either parents or children that for most people it will have had the effect of instantly destroying the credibility of the remainder of the archbishop's address.
For it is perverse to the point of absurdity to suggest that the fact that a child is wanted damages the relationship between parents and child. It is, of course, the opposite that may sometimes be the case. For, while most children who are not "wanted", in the sense of not being intended consequences of a sexual act, are nevertheless welcomed by their parents, a minority may not be so fortunate, especially where the parents are not married.
This "planned child" hare is one that should never have been started.
The real issues arising from contraception seem to me to be:
The impact of readily available contraception upon general sexual behaviour and the implications of this for society, a matter to which Archbishop Connell devoted part of his remarks;
Its impact on the global population problem;
Its impact upon the health of peoples ravaged by sexually-transmitted diseases;
Its impact upon the frequency and age pattern of child-bearing within marriage or other stable relationships. (None of these latter three issues was addressed by the archbishop).
And, finally, the nature and significance of the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" contraception, to which he did make reference.
On the first point, it is abundantly evident that "artificial" contraception has indeed changed sexual mores worldwide. And nowhere in the developed world has this been as clear as in this State, where until the advent of the Pill contraceptive methods were, in practice, unavailable.
Even allowing for the use in that pre-contraception period of "natural" methods or withdrawal by some unmarried couples, the fact that up to the mid-1960s non-marital births at 1,300 a year constituted only 2 per cent of the total number of births is clear evidence of a very low level of sexual intercourse outside marriage in the State at that time.
With due allowance for the doubling of the number of young single people since the mid-1960s, the fact that three-eighths of all pregnancies, almost 15,000, are now non-marital suggests a huge change in sexual behaviour. The concerns expressed in Humanae Vitae about the general impact of contraception on sexual behaviour have thus been justified. But that is, of course, only one aspect of the matter.
On the other side of the argument, it has to be said that in the absence of contraception the world's population could reach astronomical levels. Even with contraception it is already certain to grow a good deal further, to a level which it has been argued could out-run our capacity to feed the population, and which could involve a level of energy demand that, even with more efficient methods of energy production, is likely to lead to a dangerous level of global warming.
Moreover, there are important parts of the world where the population is growing faster than output, with the result that income per head is falling. This is true of all but two of 45 African countries, all of which have significant proportions of undernourished children: typically over one-quarter, but in some cases between two-fifths and one half.
Clearly the global benefits of contraception in terms of promoting human welfare by limiting population growth are potentially enormous.
ONE must also take into account the role of condom use in limiting the spread of AIDS and other diseases. Even allowing that there is validity in the argument that the availability of contraception has encouraged sexual promiscuity, once contraceptives are available it is difficult to argue against the use of condoms as a protection against sexually-transmitted diseases, especially in areas such as southern Africa, where whole populations are being ravaged by AIDS.
Next, it has to be recognised that contraception has proved enormously beneficial to married women, by enabling them to avoid having more children than their health can stand and, in particular, by limiting the number of pregnancies amongst married women in their late 30s and early 40s.
More generally, in weighing up the balance between the arguments for and against contraception, it is necessary to distinguish two quite separate issues that are often conflated.
The first of these is the abstract philosophical question of whether it might have been better for human society if effective and readily available contraceptive methods had never been invented. It is possible to make a case for that theoretical position, although most people would probably argue that, on balance, the three latter arguments outweigh the first.
The second issue is whether, given the availability of contraception, it is right to make use of it for the purpose of spacing or limiting families, or to minimise the risk of AIDS or other sexually-transmitted diseases.
It is the case against such use that most people have difficulty in accepting. And this difficulty is greatly increased when an absolute distinction is made between permissible "natural" contraception and impermissible "artificial" methods.
The theological arguments in favour of this distinction, rehearsed by Archbishop Connell, have never seemed convincing to the great majority of Roman Catholic laity (nor, probably, to the majority of clergy), and they carry no weight at all with those of other churches or none.
The archbishop attempts an analogy with the distinction that exists between avoiding tax legally and evading it illegally. But this analogy begs the question by assuming what he is seeking to prove, viz that "artificial" contraception is immoral and that "natural" methods are moral.
The only argument he puts forward in favour of making such an absolute distinction between the two methods depends upon a definition of "artificial" contraception as "any procedure adopted in order to prevent sexual intercourse giving rise to conception". He sees this definition as excluding the rhythm method, although I think most people would see that method as being precisely such a procedure.
An attempt to justify the exclusion of the rhythm method from this definition by distinguishing "avoiding conception" from "taking steps to suppress it" is, frankly, too subtle a distinction for non-theologians, and, indeed, for many theologians also.
The truth is that most of the arguments used by the church against "artificial" contraception apply also to "natural contraception". The archbishop argues that "artificial" contraception "breaks the bond between intercourse and procreation . . . introducing direct opposition between intercourse and procreation". But this is also true of "natural" contraception. In both cases the intent is the same and the effect is the same.
Arguing against "artificial" contraception, the archbishop contends that sexual intercourse is not a moral good. But then, in arguing for "natural" methods he seems to adopt a contrary view, for, accepting that "there may be commendable reasons for wanting to avoid conception", he goes on to say: "In that case spouses may express and foster their mutual love in sexual intercourse during the time when conception does not occur whilst abstaining from intercourse when conception is not possible". He adds: "There is here no manipulation aimed at suppressing conception."
It is the failure of the Roman Catholic Church authorities to understand how unconvincing such minute theological distinctions appear to ordinary people that has lost it the confidence of so many of its members. And these authorities have not helped themselves by the selectivity of the arguments they employ, which deliberately refuse to take into account and address the existence of powerful counter-arguments in favour of contraception.