Assault on Mosul could prove fatal for Islamic State

Opinion: The existence of an Islamic caliphate that transcends national borders in the Middle East would be called into question by the militant group’s defeat

Kurdish forces  advance on villages east of Mosul on Monday. Photograph: Bryan Denton/The New York Times
Kurdish forces advance on villages east of Mosul on Monday. Photograph: Bryan Denton/The New York Times

Late on Sunday night, the Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, appeared on television in military uniform and flanked by military commanders, to announce the launch of the long-awaited attempt by the Iraqi army to recapture the city of Mosul from Islamic State.

A diverse collection of forces is involved in this effort. It includes: the Iraqi national army, composed mostly of Shias; the military forces of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; Shia militias backed by Iran; Turkish-trained Iraqi forces; and, in smaller numbers, special forces from Britain, France and the United States. However, although the militants of Islamic State, also known as Isis, will be vastly outnumbered in Mosul by the forces ranged against them, it is widely feared that the fighting to liberate the city could take weeks or even months.

The assault on Mosul is important for a number of reasons. It is the second-largest city in Iraq and had a population of about two million people at the time of its seizure by Isis. In the space of less than a week in June 2014, some 30,000 soldiers of the Iraqi national army were defeated by 1,500 militants as the forces of Isis continued on an expansionist path that had earlier seen them take control of the towns of Fallujah and Ramadi.

The success of Isis raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the Iraqi army, which had been built up through the expenditure of billions of dollars from the US in the aftermath of its 2003 invasion of the country. It raised even deeper questions about the extent to which the Sunni minority in the country had been alienated and marginalised by successive post-invasion governments, led by the Shia Islamist Nouri al-Maliki, to the extent that rule by Isis was preferable for many Iraqi Sunnis to that of the government in Baghdad.

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The seizure of Mosul was followed on June 29th by the declaration of a caliphate by the Isis leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This, in effect, constituted a claim by al-Baghdadi that he was the leader of the global community of Muslims, successor to the prophet Muhammad in the office of caliph.

Combined with the success of Isis in neighbouring Syria at the same time, this was seen by many as constituting an attempt at reversing the geopolitical order that had been imposed on the region by European powers after the first World War. From this perspective, the declaration of the caliphate represented the undoing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 which paved the way for the later creation of the new states of Iraq and Syria.

The loss of Mosul would, therefore, constitute a major setback for Isis and a notable victory for the Iraqi government and its allies in the West. The current assault on Mosul follows a series of significant military and territorial losses for Isis in both Syria and Iraq. The city of Tikrit was recaptured in the spring of 2015, Ramadi and Falluja were liberated in January and June of 2016. Most recently, the town of Dabiq was recaptured by Turkish-backed Syrian rebels last weekend.

Dabiq plays a central role in the mythology of Isis. It is the site where, according to Isis, a battle will take place at the end of times between Muslims and their enemies. Its significance is such that the town lends its name to Isis’s English-language online magazine.

In total, Isis has lost territory equal to about the size of Sri Lanka, and has suffered very significant loss of life. If it loses Mosul, the existence of an Islamic caliphate that transcends national borders in the Middle East will be called into question.

However, while success in the battle for Mosul would be a major boost for al-Abadi’s government, there are a number of significant challenges to be faced. First, there are fears of a major humanitarian crisis for which neither the government nor its international allies seems to be prepared. According to Stephen O’Brien, the United Nations under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief, up to one million people might be forced to flee their homes by the fighting, adding to the three million people already internally displaced in the country.

There are concerns also regarding the possibility of sectarian violence against Sunni Iraqis on the part of Shia militias, which comprise a significant element of the forces taking part in the attack on Mosul. Equally worrying is the possibility that the recapture of Mosul may deepen rather than redress the fragmentation that characterises Iraq today. In the absence of any clearly articulated plan for governance of the city and the province of Nineveh in which it is located, the competing interests of those seeking to liberate it from Isis may lead to further conflict. Sunni Arab tribal militias, Shia Arab militias, Kurdish groups and Turkmen militias all have different agendas, even if they share a common enemy in Isis, while there are reports of plans for the partition of the province into cantonments along ethnic and sectarian lines.

Government success in the battle for Mosul will undoubtedly further weaken Isis, but whether it will help to stabilise Iraq or address ever-widening fragmentation in the country is greatly to be doubted.

Dr Vincent Durac lectures in Middle East politics in the school of politics and international relations at University College Dublin. He is co-author with Francesco Cavatorta of Politics and Governance in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, July 2015)