David Cameron's roll-out of Britain's renegotiation demands from the European Union yesterday was, as befits the most effective communicator in British politics, polished, persuasive and pitch perfect. The fact that neither his long-awaited letter to European Council president Donald Tusk nor his speech at Chatham House contained anything new or surprising was an advantage. So too was the lack of detail about how precisely his proposed reforms should be delivered.
For Britain’s European partners, Cameron’s list of demands did not need to be detailed or explicit, but it was crucial that they should be exhaustive. As the prime minister made clear in Chatham House, this is the final list of British demands ahead of its referendum on EU membership, which must take place before the end of 2017. Other member states need have no fear of unexpected, last-minute concessions being sought during late-night meetings. And Eurosceptics within Cameron’s Conservative Party now know that this “thin gruel”, as backbencher Jacob Rees-Mogg called it yesterday, is all they are getting.
Cameron’s demands fall under four headings: economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and immigration. On economic governance he wants an explicit acknowledgement that the EU has more than one currency; no disadvantage for any business on the basis of their country’s currency; protection for the “integrity of the single market”; euro- zone initiatives such as a banking union should be voluntary for non-euro countries; no liability for non-euro countries to financially support the euro; power over financial stability and supervision to remain with non-euro national governments; and issues that affect all EU member states should be decided by all member states.
Ever-closer union
On competitiveness
Cameron
wants less regulation of business; an easier flow of capital, goods and services throughout the EU; and a commitment to boosting competitiveness and productivity. On sovereignty he wants Britain to be free of its current EU treaty obligation to work towards “ever-closer union”; more power for national parliaments to halt unwanted EU legislation; and clear proposals for implementing the EU’s commitment to subsidiarity. On immigration he proposes that people coming to Britain from the EU should have to wait four years before they can qualify for in-work benefits or social housing, and he wants to stop sending child-benefit payments overseas.
There is broad support across much of the EU for Cameron’s demands on economic competitiveness, which echo much of the Juncker commission’s policy agenda. Enhancing the role of national parliaments is also uncontroversial, and the commitment to pursuing “ever-closer union” is a piece of rhetoric no other EU leader is likely to view as a deal-breaker.
It is the other two issues – the relationship between the euro zone and non-euro- zone countries, and welfare payments for migrants within the EU – that are likely to prove most problematic. Of the two, the euro-zone proposals are probably the most far-reaching in terms of the future of the EU, because they would limit the euro zone’s capacity to use its inbuilt qualified majority to shape EU policy. Still, if some protection for the non-euro countries is necessary to allow euro zone to integrate further, a deal should be possible.
The most politically charged issue is that of migration, both within the British domestic debate and for some of Cameron’s EU partners. For committed European integrationists, the principle of free movement within the EU is a cornerstone of the entire project, and anything that could undermine it is anathema. For the formerly communist countries that joined the EU after 2004 – who are the main targets of the proposals – they smack of second-class status for their citizens. And in Britain, immigration is the number one issue politicians encounter on the doorsteps, and anger over it is the most powerful source of hostility to the EU.
Even here, however, a deal may not be impossible, not least because Cameron is not seeking a cap on migration from within the EU, only to apply new welfare rules. If the four-year residency requirement can be designed so that it does not overtly discriminate on the basis of nationality, it might just win agreement.
The biggest danger for the EU may be that the negotiations over Cameron's demands could trigger copycat wish lists from other member states. This week, French far-right leader Marine Le Pen said that if she governed France she would follow the British prime minister's example and use the threat of a referendum to win concessions from the EU. Other member states could seek to use the British negotiations to win concessions, further complicating the process.
A deal may not be finalised at next month’s summit in Brussels, but the odds are that Cameron will achieve most of what he is looking for and will lead the campaign for Britain to remain in the EU. The question is: will the changes be enough to persuade a majority of voters to back him?
For hard-core Eurosceptics, nothing would be enough to justify staying in the EU. But even for more moderate Eurosceptics, the reforms Cameron is seeking could scarcely be described as transformative in terms of Britain’s relationship with the EU. For most voters, most of the changes Cameron is looking for involve the arcane theology of the European project and will not set the pulses racing. The exception is immigration: here the prime minister must persuade voters the concessions would reduce the number of people coming to Britain.
Much will depend on the quality of the competing campaigns, and Cameron is likely to be an effective leader of the campaign to keep Britain in the EU. At present the campaign to leave the EU is divided and fractious, led by marginal figures such as Ukip's Nigel Farage. This could change if London mayor Boris Johnson should choose to relaunch his career as the leader of the campaign to leave. If that happens, Cameron will face a real battle and Britain's future in Europe will be more uncertain. Denis Staunton is London Editor