Shortly after Finland's accession to the European Union, a Finnish diplomat remarked that it was better for small member-states to surf in the mainstream. This the Irish did for the first 29 years of membership.
A week ago today, when it became clear that the Nice Treaty had been rejected, the Government's European policy hit the rocks. Bertie Ahern is now in Gothenburg in Sweden as the awkward partner, a title once reserved for the British, whereas Tony Blair returns triumphant. Traditionally, the contrast between Irish and British policy on the EU worked to Ireland's advantage. This no longer holds.
As we contemplate the future, it is important to reassert the central role that the EU has played in producing the prosperous Ireland that we have become. Less than 50 years ago, during the first post-war trade negotiations in Europe, Ireland, together with Greece, Turkey and Iceland, were classed as "peripherals". The Irish found the economic, cultural and institutional capacity to claw their way out of that status.
The EU provided the Irish State with a framework for managing interdependence and the most benign environment for small states that European history has ever fostered. In return, Ireland made a success of membership.
The long-term impact of the outcome of the referendum on Ireland's standing in the EU, on the tone and substance of Ireland's European policy and on the future of the EU itself will unfold in the months and years ahead.
We should be in no doubt that it will have substantial effects on our relations with the EU. Clearly, Ireland's status and that of the Government have been damaged. It has already impacted on how we are seen. The story on Ireland throughout Europe is No to Nice, No to enlargement. The Irish are portrayed as selfish.
Careless rather than selfish is more apposite. The Government and the main opposition parties were extraordinarily careless in the manner in which they tackled this campaign. The imbalance in the number of Yes and No posters throughout the country was simply the most visible representation of the malaise. The electorate was taken for granted and replied accordingly.
Careless too was the lacklustre response to the arguments of the No campaign. AfrI, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance and the Green party should have been challenged in a very robust manner on their assertions concerning the Union's security policy. They were allowed appropriate the word peace, demonise NATO and use emotive terms such as militarisation without the substance of their argument being subjected to scrutiny. The irony of being joined by Sinn Fein in their argument escaped them.
I did not hear any of the above organisations explain why the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians joined NATO. Perspectives on security are moulded by threat. We need only compare the experience of Soviet tanks on the streets of Prague with the island fortress that we inhabit, far from the world's dangerous fault lines.
The Nos also needed to be challenged on their assertion that this treaty was not about enlargement. They argued that five more states could join the Union under the terms of Amsterdam. But there could well be eight states ready to join in the first wave. Which states should be assigned to the antechamber because of the Irish vote? Following surprise and shock in the other member-states, the EU will turn to problem-solving mode. One solution is to accept that the treaty will not be ratified by Ireland and hence should fall. Since all of the governments, including the Irish one, see the treaty as necessary for enlargement, this is an unlikely outcome. The heads of government in Gothenburg will reaffirm their commitment to ratification and to maintaining the enlargement timetable. This gives the Irish Government until the end of 2002 to hold a second referendum.
The Government will be wary of a re-run when it can be accused of not taking No for an answer. It will probably argue that low turnout was a major factor. The Government will also need a pretext to hold a second referendum. The other member governments will not want to reopen the substance of the treaty.
The options are thus limited to a protocol, which implies a minimal reopening, or - as is more likely - a declaration giving the Irish reassurance on the issues that led to the No. Since the absence of an exit poll makes it impossible to have an accurate take on the key issues and since the No campaign embraced a large number of groups with diverse agendas, this is a very delicate task.
The Government could opt to withdraw from the Rapid Reaction Force and thereby ensure that Irish troops could not be used in peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts even if mandated by the UN. Perversely, those committed to Irish neutrality may succeed in ensuring that Ireland's long and honourable tradition in peacekeeping is undermined.
Space does not allow for an extensive analysis of the wider impact of the No vote. It may damage Irish business interests in Eastern European markets. This is clearly the view of Michael Buckley, the chief executive of Allied Irish Banks, a firm with major Polish interests.
It will certainly dilute the enormous goodwill that the Irish have in Eastern Europe. It will make the day-to-day politics of the EU more difficult for Irish negotiators. The sweeteners that are frequently sought in agriculture, environment or other areas of regulation will be harder to get. The Government has squandered enormous capital domestically and internationally.
Wide-ranging debate on the terms of our European engagement, on the kind of EU that we want to foster and on our responsibilities to the common European home is more than ever necessary. It obliges us to cast a cold eye not just on the EU but on ourselves.
Brigid Laffan is the director of the Dublin European Institute at University College Dublin