The Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Paul Murphy, a decent man for whom I have great respect, the Chief Constable of the PSNI, Hugh Orde, who clearly wanted his force to begin on a new sheet, and an Ulster Unionist leadership licking its post-election wounds, are all exercised about the cost, time-consuming nature, and the political implications for intercommunity relations of continuing the present style of inquiry into past controversies implicating the security forces, writes Martin Mansergh
It is de rigueur these days to preface any comment relating to Northern Ireland with a dissertation on republican misdeeds since the ceasefires. The International Monitoring Commission, no doubt, has strong words to say about the attempted Tohill abduction and ongoing paramilitary activities. If they are to fulfil their purpose, their reports must act as a spur to progress and acts of completion, not as an instrument of exclusion.
Criminal intelligence should be material for prosecutions, rather than no-holds barred political retaliation. In the recent past, the principles of jurisprudence employed sometimes seemed straight out of the trial scene in Alice in Wonderland, "sentence first - verdict afterwards". The Executive was brought down 18 months ago over two incidents in particular, the arrest of the Colombia Three, and the so-called Stormontgate spying affair, which led to a high-profile police raid on the Sinn Féin offices in Stormont. Within a week or so, the then Secretary of State, John Reid, moved to another post. Within a few months, the officer conducting the raid, for the manner of which the Chief Constable apologised within 24 hours, had retired.
Despite assurances from the British Prime Minister about the gravity of the case, no doubt believed with the same passionate conviction as his sources on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the pattern of no one being put on trial and charges being quietly dropped, after all the political damage has been done, seems to be repeating itself. The Colombia Three have already served a de facto sentence of nearly three years, the trial having ended months ago without any verdict in sight. It is not as if there were thousands of pages of evidence to consider. Are they hostages to the peace process? It has always been my suspicion that, had Sinn Féin gone along as expected with the Weston Park accords of July 2001, we would have heard much less about the Colombia Three, arrested with the assistance of British intelligence.
Undoubtedly, it was foolish to venture into FARC territory, for whatever purpose, on false passports, but, if nothing else definite has been found against them, then it is high time this was acknowledged and they were sent home.
The goal of a fully democratic society in the North might have been more quickly achieved, without a constant effort at every opportunity to throw Sinn Féin off the wagon of a political settlement, and if people had waited for verdicts to act, rather than pass immediate political judgment every time any serious allegation surfaced. Nevertheless, the reality now is that the institutions can take no more stop-go, and that sharing executive power, North or South, depends on ending, however it is done, the active paramilitary link.
The Bloody Sunday Inquiry in Derry, necessary to undo the establishment whitewash of the Widgery Tribunal, illustrates the enormously costly and cumbersome nature of the judicial process in these islands, as do our tribunals. It is hard to see how it will modify the conclusion that the British army and government decided to teach Bogside rioters and demonstrators a sharp lesson on January 30th, 1971, but then tried to stand up a story about being fired on by gunmen to extenuate the enormity of 13 civilians dead.
The Oireachtas sub-committee examination of the Barron report into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings has yet to be debated in the Oireachtas before being presented formally to the British government. The demand for their co-operation will not go away.
The allegation of middle-level collusion (no one is suggesting that the Wilson government was directly involved except as a collateral target) and the murky relationship between official and paramilitary counter-terrorism needs investigation. Either the democratic state behaves on a higher plane to those attacking it, or it undermines its legitimacy by permitting itself (as the Israeli government does) to respond in kind regardless of any legal framework.
I have heard the Finucane case described at the highest level as a can of worms. There is nothing wrong with being a republican lawyer. The late Paddy McGrory, who was also under threat, was of the highest standing and integrity, and absolutely supportive of the peace process. I also knew Rosemary Nelson, who died because of her brave work representing the Garvaghy Road residents in their legitimate resistance to the bullying tactics of the Orange Order.
Many stern moralists become great pragmatists, when confronted with allegations of misbehaviour by the security forces. It is a pity that they cannot see the damage done, for example, to the historical reputation of the RUC, many of whose members were tragic victims of the Troubles, by prima facie evidence of the unacceptable attitudes and illicit acts of a small number, who would not willingly make themselves accountable even to investigating British police officers like Stalker and Stevens.
It is no use pointing elsewhere. In the case of the vast majority of murders and multiple atrocities, responsibility was acknowledged and is undisputed. While a large number remain unsolved beyond that, hundreds of convicted paramilitary prisoners served long sentences. A truth and reconciliation commission will not work, unless all concerned fully co-operate.
Regrettably, I see no real readiness to open up fully on any side. Pending consensus on an alternative, the governments have to follow the process agreed at Weston Park to investigate and then, as necessary, publicly to inquire into a small number of high profile cases on both sides.