Press freedom should be matched with obligations to achieve standards, such as a duty to inform rather than mislead, writes Onora O'Neill
One of Tom Stoppard's characters explained to another: "I'm with you on the free press. It's the newspapers I can't stand."
It is a thought many of us have had. Is a free press free to set aside good journalistic and editorial standards, to specialise in gossip and rumour, or to marginalise straightforward reporting?
If we want press freedom do we have to accept whatever we get even if some of it is offensive, deplorable or trivialising?
Contrary to many assertions, answers to these questions are not obvious.
Free press must (at least) be free from state regulation of content. If public authorities can determine what shall and what shall not be reported, the press is not free. This is non-negotiable in liberal democratic societies: no required publication of state propaganda, no state (or church!) censorship. However, not all regulation is content regulation, and not all regulation is state regulation.
Press freedom is never unconditional freedom. For example, press freedom is typically limited by legislation against defamation and incitement, by standards for advertising and for certain sorts of reporting, and by many other measures.
The European Convention on Human Rights sets out a range of legitimate reasons for qualifying press freedom (Article 10, ii), and includes a right to privacy (Article 8).
So while unqualified appeals to press freedom may provide showy rhetoric, they don't show which specific configuration of that freedom can best be justified.
There are two serious issues here. First, which restrictions on press freedom are acceptable, both in general and specifically for our times? Second, how should legitimate restrictions be secured?
Clearly restrictions on content (defamation, incitement, invasion of privacy apart) would lead back to the bad old days of censorship and propaganda. So any justifiable regulation is likely to apply to process rather than content.
The adequacy of newspaper procedures can be judged by the extent to which their work contributes to public life and democracy. Press freedom matters because citizens have to rely on the media for their understanding and knowledge of public affairs; it should meet the needs of citizens.
Press freedom should, therefore, be matched by obligations to achieve certain standards: to inform rather than mislead, to cover issues of public importance, to correct mistakes,
Press freedom is badly configured where readers cannot readily distinguish reporting from commentary, or information from entertainment (hybrid genres such as "infotainment" and "advertorials" are suspect). It is misused if newspapers do not aim for accuracy, check their facts and correct mistakes.
It is abused if the public is not safeguarded from "news management" that covertly pursues or protects the interests of owners, editors and journalists (especially when reporting on financial, planning and political issues).
It is endangered if the interests of owners, editors and journalists and conflicts of interest are hidden from the public, leaving those with an interest free to promote it under the guise of reporting or offering independent commentary.
In an era of unparalleled media power, and increasing concentration of ownership, the public needs reliable safeguards. What worked for the mighty Skibbereen Eagle in its heyday will not be enough in a world of media conglomerates with powerful commercial interests.
There is, in fact, a fair degree of agreement that standards matter, and even about which standards matter.
But there is remarkably little agreement about how these standards are to be secured, and about what will and will not work in a world where newspapers are under severe financial and competitive pressures, and their owners have far-reaching commercial interests.
Current controversy is often not about standards, but about the rival merits of self-regulation and regulation that has (some degree of) statutory backing for achieving either minimal or good standards.
The UK Press Complaints Commission offers a conspicuous example of a minimal form of newspaper self-regulation. The commission was established by the newspaper industry in the UK some 15 years ago to avert the threat of statutory regulation and is composed of a mix of editors and "lay" persons. It receives and "resolves" complaints from members of the public about breaches of its code of practice that have affected them.
Writing in this newspaper recently, the chairman of the commission, Sir Christopher Meyer, claimed that it has provided an effective form of self-regulation, and suggested that it is the only alternative to unacceptable state regulation that would damage press freedom. Many would disagree.
By themselves, complaints procedures are extraordinarily unlikely to secure the standards that citizens in democracies need in their media. In the nature of the case, complaint procedures focus on individuals' complaints. They can work well (together with consumer protection legislation) in dealing with defective consumer goods. But good reporting is a public good, not merely a consumer good. Its quality matters for democracy and society, and complaints procedures will not be enough to improve or ensure standards.
Stronger forms of self-regulation could do more to secure adequate standards. For example, newspapers that were serious about self-regulation could deal robustly and systematically with declarations of interest and conflicts of interest.
They could institute independently administered, professionally assisted "rights of reply" that gave equal prominence to the views of anyone whom they have travestied.
They could sanction journalists or editors who accept payments to cover particular matters or to cover them with a particular slant. They could make public whenever a story has been obtained by ambush, entrapment or payment. Such procedures would allow the public to judge what they read more confidently.
So serious self-regulation is not in principle impossible. But getting it is another matter. State power and censorship are not the only enemies of press freedom: market power may not work by censorship yet it too can shape and limit public knowledge and opinion.
While a return to state control of content is unthinkable in liberal democracies, statutory regulation of media process is not unthinkable and may prove necessary. It will prove unnecessary where the press institute serious forms of self-regulation and necessary where they do not.
Prof Onora O'Neill, a philosopher, is principal of Newnham College, Cambridge