In Vladimir Putin’s view of the world, Russia and the West are motivated above all by the same thing: national self-interest. The only difference is that he admits it. The Americans and the Europeans may claim to be driven by the higher principles of human rights, freedom and democracy, he believes, but ultimately, for them as for him, power is everything, and interests will always trump values.
The assumption underpinned Putin's decision to invade Ukraine. He calculated that western government would stop short of imposing severe sanctions that would come at a heavy cost to their own economies. He assumed that Europe cared so little for Ukraine and was itself so badly divided that any condemnation of his attack would never be accompanied by the kind of practical military support that could actually stymie his plans. Having in the past sought to weaponise Europe's tensions over migration, he no doubt believed that a massive wave of Ukrainian refugees moving westward was guaranteed to cause social unrest and set EU states against one another.
Proved wrong
On each of these counts, Putin has so far been proved wrong. The United States has imposed tough sanctions and sent billions of dollars worth of lethal weaponry to Ukraine. With a speed and cohesion that seemed to surprise even its own leaders, the EU reacted to the bloodshed on its doorstep by adopting an unprecedented sanctions package and channelling military aid to Ukraine. It offered safe haven to Ukrainian refugees, invoking for the first time a temporary-protection directive that allows new arrivals the right to live, work and receive welfare payments across the union. Policies that stood for decades were thrown out overnight. Germany halted the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, sent arms to Ukraine and is working to phase out its dependence on Russian energy. The public mobilisation has been just as remarkable. Across Europe, but particularly in the east, citizens have opened their homes for millions of Ukrainians fleeing the war. The population of Warsaw alone increased by almost 20 per cent in just a few weeks.
Filipo Grandi, the head of the UN refugee agency, fears that hostility towards Ukrainians could spread. `Solidarity might exhaust itself and provoke a backlash,' he said
More attritional phase
Exemplary as the western response has been, however, the true test of European solidarity is yet to come. Putin's war has entered a new, more attritional phase and both sides are digging in for a conflict that could grind on for years. Western public and media attention will at some point begin to decline, and fatigue or even disillusionment could set in if governments are seen to be mishandling the reception of refugees and the perception takes hold that the costs of integration are not being equitably distributed. Dissent is already evident in some eastern countries, and it is likely that Russian disinformation about the war in Ukraine will gain more traction. In Slovakia, where fake news disseminated via social media has a wide audience, a survey by the Academy of Sciences last month found that 34 per cent of respondents thought the war in Ukraine was provoked by the West and 28 per cent believed Putin's false narrative about Russia's desire to "de-nazify" Ukraine. Filipo Grandi, the head of the UN refugee agency, fears that hostility towards Ukrainians could spread. "Solidarity might exhaust itself and provoke a backlash," he said.
While European leaders have issued positive signals about Ukraine's future as `one of us', there are divergent views within the union on when and how it might join the EU
Moscow has been working assiduously to punch holes in that united front. Russia's move this week to cut off gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria was ostensibly due to their refusal to comply with Putin's demand for payment in roubles. The decision will have relatively limited effect – both countries planned to let their contracts with the Russian oil giant Gazprom expire at the end of the year anyway. But by targeting two of the EU's most vocal advocates of reducing reliance on Russian gas, Putin was sending a message to other EU states that might be tempted to follow suit. The split that emerged in recent days over whether complying with the new payments system laid down by Moscow amounted to a breach of sanctions will have gratified Moscow. Putin will also hope that western public support for sanctions will weaken as energy prices rise in the autumn.
Loggerheads
The longer the war goes on, the harder it will be to conceal differences that western leaders have done well to gloss over in the early stages of the crisis. France argues that the cost of sanctions and stronger defence should be met by a joint fund like the one used to fight the Covid pandemic, but "frugal" northerners are sceptical. Germany and the UK are at loggerheads of refugee policy, which has been open in the former and restrictive in the latter. The rule-of-law disputes with Poland and Hungary continue to simmer in the background, as do wider disagreements over whether the future of European defence lies in new EU structures, as France would prefer, or in Nato, which is regarded by eastern states as an indispensable security guarantor. And while European leaders have issued positive signals about Ukraine's future as "one of us", there are divergent views within the union on when and how it might join the EU.
“Unity is key,” German chancellor Olaf Scholz said recently. “Unity in the EU, unity in the G7 and in Nato. All that is something that Putin did not expect.” If Putin is right about the primacy of interests over values, power over principle, that unity will eventually fracture. Europe has to prove him wrong.