We are making peacekeeping impossible because of our "triple lock" procedure, writes Lieut Gen Gerry McMahon.
On his recent visit to Dublin, the secretary general of the UN, Mr Kofi Annan, spoke about the huge surge of conflict situations that has taken place over the past decade.
He also had some direct requests for assistance from the EU, including Ireland. Is Ireland properly prepared to render this assistance?
UN peacekeeping, in which Ireland over the years cut her teeth, has changed dramatically since the early 1990s.
In the very early days the parties in conflict, prodded by their Cold War patrons, agreed to stop fighting. The UN, having received assurances from the superpowers and agreement from the countries involved in the conflict, deployed UN peacekeeping forces to keep the lid on the situation while diplomatic and political efforts were employed to solve the problem.
The whole process was painfully slow and carefully choreographed, but given the deliberate and controlled nature of the Cold War world, it suited everybody.
Eventually a lightly-armed UN force was deployed into a reasonably benign situation on the ground.
Capable of self-defence, the UN force posed no threat to the opposing forces in the area. When problems arose on the ground, they were solved through liaison with the parties in conflict, and by pressure from the superpower patrons.
The end of the Cold War changed everything. UN troops were deployed into areas where battles were still being waged; were deployed too slowly in genocide situations and didn't have the weaponry to attain their missions.
In the circumstances the UN was seen to fail, and the UN suffered a loss of image and prestige. The organisation, therefore, endeavoured to examine its peacekeeping procedures and introduce reform.
The Brahimi Report tried to point the way forward.
Inter alia it recognised that there were still low-level intensity situations where UN (blue beret) forces, controlled directly by the UN from New York, were relevant.
There was also, however, a need for heavily-armed forces with enforcement powers under the command of either lead nations or regional organisations. Brahimi envisaged these forces working to a UN mandate under the terms of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.
Over recent years there have been several successful operations conducted on the Brahimi model.
East Timor was stabilised by a UN-mandated but Australian-led force, which was replaced by a more traditional UN peacekeeping force with an enforcement mandate once the situation had been brought under control.
In this instance, Irish soldiers served under Australian command during the early high-octane days, but swapped their black berets for blue when the UN took control.
Brahimi also stressed the importance of highly-trained, heavily-armed forces which could be rapidly deployed into potential trouble spots before things got out of hand. The EU had been developing rapid reaction forces since 1999, and so the UN and EU agreed on their use in September 2003.
Ireland has played a significant role in these developments, particularly during our presidency. Early prototype multinational units are already deployed. In Kosovo, the Irish serve in a combined Finnish-Irish unit, under NATO command and with a UN mandate. In Liberia, the Irish combine with the Swedes in a UN-controlled and mandated force.
The fact that these units are dubbed "battle groups" has caused some excitement. To a soldier a "battle group" has a specific meaning. It is a mixed arms unit, which brings together its disparate weapons and elements in a co-ordinated way towards the attainment of its mission.
Some politicians may take a squeamish attitude to the term, and indeed they are welcome to come up with an alternative sobriquet.
Mr Annan specifically requested support from the EU's rapid deployment "battle groups".
He used the example of the EU-controlled, French-led force which deployed into the Congo in Operation Artemis. It succeeded in stabilising a deteriorating situation before handing over to a UN force.
Although Ireland has been involved in developing these forces, it is likely that Irish troops will be precluded from participation.
The secretary general is visualising a problem that he has often seen before.
Take the example of a country where a serious situation is developing very fast, with hundreds of civilians being butchered.
The Security Council is locked in debate because of the intransigence of one or more of its permanent members. The secretary general, therefore, asks the EU to go in, protect civilian lives and stabilise the situation while the Security Council continues its debates. There is no UN mandate yet, but it will emerge in a matter of days or weeks. The EU decides to agree to the request on humanitarian grounds, and prepares to deploy "battle groups".
Ireland has the relevant troops properly equipped and ready to go. We cannot, however, deploy these troops.
We cannot help. We can decry the slaughter, but we can do nothing of a practical nature because there is no UN mandate yet.
Our troops will stay at home and sit on their hands until the Security Council finally agrees a mandate.
Only then will our Dáil meet, debate the issue and decide to send troops. The UN mandate lock of the Irish "triple lock" mechanism guarantees inactivity.
Why can't our elected representatives in the Oireachtas decide on the secretary general's requests on a case-by-case basis?
Peace support operations have changed dramatically since our first soldiers went overseas in 1958. The Defence Forces have changed to meet these new challenges.
It is time that our decision-making processes also changed.
Lieut Gen Gerry McMahon is a former chief-of-staff of the Defence Forces. He has extensive UN peacekeeping experience in the Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. He also worked at UN headquarters in New York