A memorable childhood event of mine was a tour of a French navy submarine in Cork harbour. At the time, the cold war meant that the contours of the world order were rigidly set, and there was little role for Ireland in it. Today, the recent debacle over the cancelled sale of French submarines by Australia, and the creation of a new military alliance Aukus (Australia, UK and the US) illustrates the rapidly changing world order, and the many dilemmas this will present for Ireland.
In the space of a couple of weeks, the US twice enacted a strategic decision (the exit from Afghanistan being the first) that has been motivated by a need to face down China, that has left transatlantic relations in tatters, and whose execution has been careless.
The US-led move to coral Australia and the UK into Aukus is yet another event that unambiguously heralds the end of a globalised world, and the formation of a multipolar one. In the globalised world, the US was the singular power, it didn’t need to fear China and was so dominant it provided a military comfort blanket for Europe. Now, in a multipolar world, where at least three large regions (US, China, EU) do things in very different ways, new gangs are springing up.
France may ultimately not regret losing the chance to pit itself against China in the South China Sea, but it is upset that its stock of power in Washington has been diminished
For instance, the English-speaking geopolitical world (thankfully excepting Ireland) will give greater credence to the Five Eyes intelligence-gathering alliance (UK, US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia). In addition, the Quad Alliance of India, Japan, Australia and the US has taken on added importance though India is getting much less out of this than Australia in terms of hardware. Aukus builds on these relationships and helps the UK by giving it a risky geopolitical role it could not have conceived by itself. Standing off against them is the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), whose principal active members are China, Russia and Pakistan.
More specifically, submarines have often had a costly political impact – they have, for example, been the centre of corruption scandals in Greece, Portugal and Pakistan/France in recent decades. The Australian decision to renege on the contract with France’s Naval Group was not without warning, but apparent assurances from Australian and American officials to French counterparts in recent weeks has understandably produced an apoplectic reaction in Paris. France may ultimately not regret losing the chance to pit itself against China in the South China Sea, but it is upset that its stock of power in Washington has been diminished.
If France feels aggressed by the Australian-US move, think of how China may react. The underlying threat behind the US deal to sell submarines to Australia is that, as some speculate, nuclear weapons might follow. Indeed, the blueprint for the next development wave of the US navy, called BattleForce 2045, is heavily focused on manned and unmanned submarines, at a huge financial cost.
Economics rather than submarines will determine the outcome of the strategic contest between the US and China
As it stands, China has a numerically larger navy than the US, but a far less proficient one. What military strategists may be missing is that by the time Australia takes delivery of its new American nuclear subs, the demographics of China will have dramatically changed in that there will be many older, retired people, and as the recent case of Evergrande suggests, China could have suffered a sharp economic downturn. Both trends suggest that economics rather than submarines will determine the outcome of the strategic contest between the US and China.
The result of this deepening rivalry, and apparent estrangement of Europe by Washington should convince even the most naive European leaders that they need to work very hard to make Europe a relevant geopolitical player. That France is the target of the latest snub speaks to its role as the most significant military player in Europe, and still underlines the reality that Paris (through Emmanuel Macron) is the source of political energy across Europe.
So, for Europe that challenge is to now make a credible effort to build and exercise its own power, or what Macron calls strategic autonomy. Tangibly it points toward an EU army. Europe’s “power” does not need to be conceived of solely in military terms, but can be financial, diplomatic and institutional.
A range of factors will shape this. Ideally, French diplomacy will become less introspective, and will also take heed of the views of other European nations, especially Poland and the Baltic states as regards Russia. Much will also depend on the identity and views of the next German leader, but it is very clear now that Europe needs to commit greater economic resources and political energy to the many aspects of what constitute “security” – from energy to cyberwar to immigration policy to heavy military transport.
Europe needs to commit greater economic resources and political energy to the many aspects of 'security'
All of this will make life more challenging for Ireland. The Aukus spat is the equivalent of Ireland’s cousins attacking its new best friend.
This will produce a geopolitical identity crisis for Ireland and our policy of neutrality – while Ireland’s chosen international political path is Europe, many Europeans including many in Paris where I live, regard Ireland as part of the Aukus world, and I suspect that Joe Biden himself does not readily associate Ireland with “Europe”.
As such, Ireland will increasingly be forced to choose between Europe and English-speaking countries. It can also, uniquely, mediate them and one idea for Ireland’s outperforming diplomatic corps is to introduce a UK/US-EU Sherpa to informally act to better align and “translate” the debate between Washington and Brussels.
The other implication of changing geopolitics relates to Ireland’s security, which has either been ignored as a strategic issue or been outsourced to others. Poor morale, payment issues and a recruitment problem in our military are markers of this. The ongoing defence review is welcome and may point towards active participation in an EU army. Greater attention should also be paid to our lack of a cybersecurity capability (compared to smaller states like Estonia and the Netherlands) and the need for investment in drones.
Of course, if we want them, the French have some cheap submarines for sale.
Mike O’Sullivan is author of The Levelling (Public Affairs) and Ireland and the Global Question