How do the Southern public and Northern Catholics feel about embracing, or at least accepting, symbols typically associated with British-identifying Northern Protestants?
In the ARINS/Irish Times North and South surveys, we showed all respondents, North and South, the same image of the Red Hand of Ulster.
We also provided all respondents with an accurate factual description of the image, but different sets of respondents received a different description.
In both the North and the South, respondents were randomly assigned to one or other of two groups.
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For one random half of respondents, the information emphasised the Red Hand’s factual association with hardline unionism and loyalism: “The Red Hand is a symbol often used to represent Ulster. It is used by loyalist paramilitaries on their flags.”
For another random half of respondents, information emphasised facts about the shared heritage and tradition of the image: “The Red Hand is a symbol often used to represent Ulster. It is used by the Gaelic Athletic Association – the GAA – on its Ulster flag to represent one of the four provinces of Ireland. The Red Hand is also on the Ulster Banner which is the flag used to represent the Northern Ireland football team.”
All respondents were then asked to indicate how negative or positive they felt about the Red Hand of Ulster, on a 1-7 scale where 1 is “very negative” and 7 is “very positive”.
In the South, how information is presented has a big effect. Two thirds of respondents are negative towards the Red Hand of Ulster (1-3 on the scale) when the “hardline loyalist” description is presented, compared to just half in the “shared tradition” condition. And one in 10 are positive (5-7 on the scale) in the group with the “hardline loyalist” description compared to one in six in the “shared tradition” condition.
A similar pattern emerges among Northern Catholics. A clear majority (57 per cent) view the symbol negatively when the “hardline loyalist” description is presented but only a minority (47 per cent) do so in the “shared tradition” description. And three in 10 (29 per cent) are positive in the “shared tradition” group and only two in 10 view the symbol favourably in the group that receives the “hardline loyalist” description.
We also asked respondents about the use of the Red Hand of Ulster as a symbol in a potential united Ireland: What did they think about having the image of the Red Hand of Ulster embossed on one of the euro coins in the event of unification?
Southerners were, on balance, opposed to the idea. However, the intensity of their opposition depended on which description they received.
Two thirds (65 per cent) who were presented with the “hardline loyalist” description were opposed compared, to just over half (54 per cent) in the “shared tradition” condition. And one third (34 per cent) who received the “shared tradition” description either took a neutral view or supported the idea, compared to a quarter (23 per cent) in the “hardline loyalist” condition.
Advocates of unification who want to accommodate the new minority in a potential united Ireland will increase Southern and Northern Catholic support for the Red Hand of Ulster if they successfully emphasise its status as shared heritage.
Among Northern Catholics a similar pattern emerged. A majority in the “shared tradition” group either took a neutral or supportive view (52 per cent), compared to two fifths in the group that received the “hardline loyalist” description.
[ Republic says no to poppy and Red Hand of Ulster: voters hostile to Northern symbols ]
These findings suggest that the balance of opinion among Southerners and Northern Catholics is negative towards the Red Hand of Ulster.
But the extent of their hostility is sensitive to the factual information used to describe the symbol: it is substantially lower when the shared heritage of the Red Hand is highlighted.
Advocates of unification who want to accommodate the new minority in a potential united Ireland will increase Southern and Northern Catholic support for the Red Hand of Ulster if they successfully emphasise its status as shared heritage.
But is it possible that emphasising the shared nature of the Red Hand of Ulster would irritate and alienate those Northern Protestants used to the image being singularly associated with their group?
No, is the current answer. When we ran the same analysis on Northern Protestants, we did not find that respondents in the “shared tradition” group were, to a statistically significantly extent, less positive about the Red Hand of Ulster, or significantly more opposed to it being stamped on a euro coin.
The overall tendency is for Northern Protestant respondents to be positive about the Red Hand (three fifths) rather than negative (one in six). And they are more likely to favour the Red Hand image on a Euro coin (one in three) than oppose it (one in five), but the most frequent response is “neither opposed nor in favour” (two fifths).
In addition to the Red Hand symbol, we conducted a similar exercise on another symbol typically associated with British rather than Irish national identity: the poppy.
All respondents were shown an image of the poppy. For one random half of respondents, its British association was emphasised: “Poppies are worn to honour and remember those in the British armed forces who lost their lives on active service from the beginning of the first World War up to the present day.”
For the other random half of respondents, the description avoided the British association: “The poppy is a symbol of remembering those who have died in war and conflict and is a symbol of a hopeful and peaceful future.”
We did not find any statistically significant differences between the two groups receiving the different descriptions, either in the South or among Northern Catholics.
That suggests that views on the poppy are solidly entrenched and do not depend on how it is described.
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In the overall sample in the South, 44 per cent had a negative view and 29 per cent a positive view of the poppy, while 49 per cent were opposed to it being put on a euro coin and 15 per cent were in favour.
Among Northern Catholics, 52 per cent had a negative view and 26 per cent a positive view, while 42 per cent were opposed to it being put on a euro coin and 19 per cent were in favour.
These experiments on cultural symbols allow us to conclude that Northern Protestants are more inflexible on the Irish flag and the shamrock than Southerners and Northern Catholics are about the Commonwealth and the Red Hand of Ulster
While the overall pattern among those on the island who are traditional nationalists – Southerners and Northern Catholics – is scepticism towards the poppy, hostility is somewhat less intense than for the Red Hand.
In a further question we did not ask about the poppy, but rather inquired more generally whether respondents were in favour of or opposed to “commemorating those who lost their lives serving in the armed forces during the two world wars”.
Both Southerners and Northern Catholics are more in favour (47 and 50 per cent respectively) than opposed (17 and 13 per cent respectively). So it may be that it is not war commemoration per se that Southerners and Northern Catholics oppose, but the use of the poppy to do so. De-emphasising the British association of the poppy is unlikely to lessen opposition to its symbolic use.
These novel ARINS/Irish Times experiments on cultural symbols allow us to conclude that Northern Protestants are more inflexible on the Irish flag and the shamrock than Southerners and Northern Catholics are about the Commonwealth and the Red Hand of Ulster.
Overall, the entirety of our recent surveys and experiments reveal some flexibility among Southerners on processes that might lead to symbolic change – even to the flag and anthem – and Southern willingness to consider significant constitutional change, including on the nature of the presidency and the composition of the Seanad.
