North and South

Sharp divides in attitudes to immigration within Northern Ireland, and either side of Border

Northern unionists are far more likely to be anti-immigration compared with their nationalist counterparts, while southern nationalists sit somewhere in between

A counter-protest against an anti-immigration demonstration in Belfast last August. Photograph: Paul Faith/AFP via Getty
A counter-protest against an anti-immigration demonstration in Belfast last August. Photograph: Paul Faith/AFP via Getty
John Garry
Brendan O'Leary
Jamie Pow
Dawn Walsh
Sat Feb 15 2025 - 06:00

Immigration raises both economic and cultural controversies, sometimes deeply dividing citizens.

The Arins/Irish Times surveys may be used to examine how the supporters of the two main forms of nationalism on the island – Irish and British – navigate the question of immigration. To do so we adapted questions widely used in international social science surveys.

North and South, our respondents were asked:

Would you say it is generally bad or good for the economy that people come to live in [Northern Ireland/the Republic] from other countries?

Respondents were able to indicate their position on a 0-10 scale, running from “bad for the economy” (0) to “good for the economy” (10).

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Respondents were separately asked:

And would you say that cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live in [Northern Ireland/the Republic] from other countries?

Again, respondents were asked to indicate their position, running from “cultural life is undermined” (0) to “cultural life is enriched” (10).

Then we created a “pro-immigration” measure to capture respondents who indicated that they feel closer to the positive responses on both the economic and the cultural questions (that is, they responded between 6 and 10 on both questions).

About half of the public in the North (47 per cent) are pro-immigration on this measure.

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This overall figure, however, masks a significant division in attitudes.

Supporters of the British nationalist position are less supportive of immigration than supporters of the Irish nationalist position.

In the North only a third of Protestants, and pro-union respondents, and only a fifth supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party are pro-immigration.

By contrast, between three-fifths and two thirds of Catholics, pro-unity respondents and supporters of the SDLP and (northern) Sinn Féin are pro-immigration.

A similar pattern emerges for national identity. In the North, 33 per cent of those who identify as British are favourably disposed to immigration, compared with 64 per cent who identify as Irish: a ratio of nearly 2:1.

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By contrast, among the 90 per cent of people in the South who identify as Irish, 48 per cent favour immigration. Their responses sit in between those of the British in the North and the Irish in the North.

The distinction in the North between pro-immigration Irish nationalists and anti-immigration unionists remains strong even when we control for levels of education, which is strongly related to attitudes to immigration across most democratic countries.

Voters for nationalist parties with university degrees are more liberal on immigration than voters for unionist parties with university degrees by a proportion of 72 to 47 per cent; and nationalist voters without university degrees are nearly three times as positive towards immigrants (57 per cent) as unionist voters without university degrees (20 per cent).

Highly educated unionist party voters, remarkably, are less liberal on immigration than nationalist voters without degrees by a margin of 10 per cent (the difference between 47 per cent and 57 per cent respectively).

This division on immigration attitudes within Sinn Féin, between its northern and southern components, creates a challenge for the party

This picture of conservative unionism and liberal nationalism on immigration in the North and the South is complicated by the fact that the support base of Sinn Féin in the South is quite anti-immigration.

Just 38 per cent of Sinn Féin supporters in the South think immigration is good for the economy and culture – a figure that is very similar to Ulster Unionist Party supporters in the North. And it is clearly much lower than the 61 per cent of Sinn Féin supporters in the North who are pro-immigration.

This division on immigration attitudes within Sinn Féin, between its northern and southern components, creates a challenge for the party. When it comes to immigration, what type of united Ireland will Sinn Féin advocate (subject to the European Union’s freedom of movement rules)?

Sinn Féin president Mary Lou McDonald and First Minister of Northern Ireland Michelle O'Neill. Photograph: Alan Betson
Sinn Féin president Mary Lou McDonald and First Minister of Northern Ireland Michelle O'Neill. Photograph: Alan Betson

If Sinn Féin advocates for the operation of a liberal immigration regime under unification, in line with its northern support base, it may alienate its southern working-class support base, which is currently sceptical of immigration.

But, if Sinn Féin advocates that a quite restrictive immigration policy should operate under unification, that would be in line with its southern support base and would potentially be positively regarded by unionists.

Unionists’ views on immigration may, of course, change in the context of Irish unification.

They may currently be sceptical of immigration partly because they see immigrants to be diluting the “Britishness” of the union. In the event of Irish unification, some of them might switch to seeing immigration in a more positive light because it would dilute the “Irishness” of unification.

The most pro-immigration respondents of all are people in the North who are in the neither Protestant nor Catholic group (that is, the “others”), Alliance supporters, and those in the South who “don’t know” on the unification referendum question. About 7 out of 10 in these groups are pro-immigration.

Their responses may be partly explained by class and education: they tend to be highly educated and middle class, traits generally associated with economic and cultural views that are pro-immigration.

European identity

Having dual identities therefore matters for how one perceives immigrants. Photograph: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Bloomberg
Having dual identities therefore matters for how one perceives immigrants. Photograph: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Bloomberg

The Arins/Irish Times surveys clearly demonstrate that attitudes to immigration vary by national identity, but we also sought to examine whether there is variation within “Irish” and “British” dispositions depending on whether people also have a European identity.

All respondents, North and South, were asked to indicate on a 0-10 scale the extent to which they feel European, where 0 is “not at all” and 10 is “very strongly”.

Responses were summarised into three groupings: not at all European (0), somewhat European (1-5), and fairly strongly European (6-10).

Unsurprisingly, respondents North and South who are “Irish” are more likely to be in the positive than negative European identity categories, while the reverse is true for British identifiers in the North.

A consistent pattern, however, emerges regarding attitudes to immigration.

Among “Irish” respondents in the South, those who also identify as European are almost twice as likely to be pro-immigrant (58 per cent) than are those who identify as Irish only and not at all European (31 per cent).

In the North, four-fifths (79 per cent) of Irish identifiers who are also fairly strongly European are pro-immigration, compared with just half (51 per cent) among the Irish-only respondents.

Among British identifiers in the North we find the same pattern.

Three-fifths of those who are also fairly strongly European are pro-immigration, while just slightly over a quarter (27 per cent) of British identifiers who do not feel European at all are pro-immigration.

Having dual identities therefore matters for how one perceives immigrants, particularly when the second identity is “supranational” as is the European identity.

Across the two biggest national identity traditions on the island, also holding a European identity is associated with pro-immigration attitudes.

The potential role of European identity is more than just a curiosity.

Under Irish unification, Northern Ireland would rejoin the European Union.

If rejoining facilitates an increase in European identity among the new British minority, this could, in turn, reduce anti-immigrant sentiment. Conversely, if being obliged to rejoin the EU prompts a negative reaction among the new British minority, these people will need to be compensated by other accommodating institutions and credible economic and cultural pledges to ease their political integration.